Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Father killed Mother in their oldest son’s immediate presence. The probate court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 22 Me. Rev. Stat. 4055(1)(B)(2)(a). The court presumed jeopardy against Father with respect to the oldest son based on its finding that Father acted in callous disregard for his son’s emotional well-being and had failed to protect his son from “a profound emotional injury” in a manner that was heinous and abhorrent to society. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the presumption of jeopardy does not apply only when a parent inflicts physical harm upon a child and that the presumption was applicable in this case. View "In re J.H." on Justia Law

When the father of Daniel Albert and Carlton Albert died, the father’s company was left in trust for the benefit of Daniel and Carlton. In 1984, Daniel bought the land from company and later conveyed it to Carlton in exchange for Carlton’s shares in the company. In 1992, Daniel purchased the land from Carlton and, in turn, released Carlton from his debt on a loan Daniel had previously extended to him. In 2010, Carlton commenced this action seeking imposition of a constructive trust on the land, alleging that, at the time of the 1992 land transfer, Daniel breached a confidential relationship existing between them. The trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err (1) in finding that Daniel and Carlton did not have a confidential relationship at the time of the land conveyance; and (2) in concluding, alternatively, that even if a confidential relationship did exist, the 1992 land transaction was free of any undue influence affecting Carlton’s interests. View "Albert v. Albert" on Justia Law

In 2010, Gregory Sullwold died of a heart attack while exercising on a treadmill in his home. Sullwood was employed by the Salvation Army at the time of his death, and the Salvation Army permitted Sullwold to work remotely from home. In 2011, Sullwold’s widow filed a petition for award of compensation, alleging that Sullwold’s work resulted in his heart attack. The Workers’ Compensation Board granted the petition. A hearing officer reaffirmed the original order, finding that work stress was a major factor in Sullwold’s death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing officer (1) did not err in finding that the evidence triggered the presumption found in 39-A Me. Rev. Stat. 327, which provides that an employee covered by the Maine Workers’ Compensation Act must be paid compensation if he or she receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment; and (2) did not erroneously shift the burden of persuasion to the Salvation Army in this case. View "Sullwold v. Salvation Army" on Justia Law

In 2003, John Doe XLVI pleaded guilty to and was convicted of possession of sexually explicit material. When Doe was sentenced, possession of sexually explicit material was not a sex offense requiring registration under Maine’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act of 1999 (SORNA), and therefore, Doe was not ordered to comply with SORNA. Possession of sexually explicit material was subsequently added to the list of sex offenses. In 2009, the Legislature amended SORNA to provide that a duty to register “is not triggered by a court determination, but by and upon notification.” In 2012, Doe received a notice of the duty to register. Doe filed this action seeking to enjoin the State from pursuing criminal charges against him for failing to register, alleging, inter alia, that SORNA was an invalid bill of attainder. The superior court rejected Doe’s challenges. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court, holding that SORNA is punitive as to offenders who were not sentenced to comply with SORNA when SORNA registration was part of sentencing and who were subsequently subjected to SORNA registration when their earlier offenses were added to the statutory list of sex offenses and registration was removed from sentencing. View "John Doe XLVI v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Wyman was charged with operating under the influence (OUI) and, after a jury trial, found not guilty. Jeffrey and his son, David Wyman (Defendant), both testified during the OUI trial. The instant perjury case stemmed from this testimony. Both Defendant and his father were indicted for perjury. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of perjury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the State presented proof of the elements of perjury with respect to David’s testimony, the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting cell phone billing records over Defendant’s objection. View "State v. Wyman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of perjury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to introduce testimony regarding Defendant’s silence following his arrest for operating under the influence (OUI) and by allowing the State to refer to this testimony during closing argument; (2) Defendant failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing a police officer to testify to his opinion that “there were lies told” during Defendant’s trial for OUI, at which Defendant was acquitted, or that the opinion was prejudicial to him; and (3) admitting the testimony of a Verizon employee about the contents of Defendant’s cell phone billing record that the State offered as the testimony of a custodian of records. View "State v. Wyman" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary, theft by unauthorized taking, and violation of a condition of release. The court imposed an aggregate sentence of seven years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argued, inter alia, that the trial court effectively prevented him from testifying when, prior to trial, it reserved ruling on the extent to which the State would be permitted to impeach his potential testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not obviously err in declining to give Defendant a pretrial ruling; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. View "State v. Perkins" on Justia Law

James Dickau was injured when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Irida Macomber. At the time of the accident, Dickau was covered by two insurance policies - a Dairyland Insurance Company policy and a Vermont Mutual personal umbrella policy. Dickau settled his claim against Macomber for her policy limit and also settled his claim for uninsured motorist benefits with Dairyland. Dickau then sought a declaratory judgment that his umbrella policy with Vermont Mutual provides for uninsured motorist coverage, and alternatively, that Vermont Mutual was required to provide uninsured motorist coverage under statute. The superior court granted Vermont Mutual’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Dickau’s umbrella policy with Vermont Mutual itself unambiguously provides no UM coverage; and (2) Maine’s UM statute does not require Vermont Mutual to provide UM coverage in the umbrella policy. View "Dickau v. Vermont Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2013, pursuant to the Freedom of Access Act (FOAA), Phillip Bowler requested a copy of the Attorney General’s investigative file concerning a death that occurred in 1953. The Deputy Attorney General denied Bowler access to the file on the ground that it was designated confidential by statute. Bowler appealed to the superior court. The superior court denied the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in finding that the file was made confidential by statute; (2) the Attorney General did not waive the statutory confidentiality of the file by releasing a copy to the decedent’s family; and (3) Defendant’s argument that releasing the file to a family member but not to him violated his constitutional right to equal protection failed. View "Bowler v. State" on Justia Law

Pisgah Mountain, LLC applied to the Town of Clifton Planning Board for approval to construct and operate a wind energy project. Peter and Julie Beckford, who own land adjacent to the proposed development site, timely appealed the Board’s decision to the Town’s Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA). The ZBA denied the appeal. Thereafter, the Beckfords filed a complaint in superior court pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 80B. Pisgah and the Town moved to dismiss the Beckfords’ complaint on the ground that it was filed outside of the forty-five-day appeal period. The superior court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the forty-five-day appeal period started when the ZBA issued its written findings and decision and not on the day the ZBA voted to deny the appeal. The court then vacated the Board’s decision to approve the permit. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the statutory appeal period commenced with the ZBA’s public vote, and therefore, the Beckfords’ Rule 80B appeal was untimely filed. View "Beckford v. Town of Clifton" on Justia Law