Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was two adjacent beachfront lots - lot 113 and lot 114. In 1989, as a result of a merger clause in a zoning ordnance, the lots were merged into a single, nonconforming, grandfathered lot. Despite the merger clause’s prohibition of any separation of a merged lot that would result in an area that did not meet minimum lot-size requirements, the owner separated the lots and conveyed them to two different individuals. Carol Reece acquired lot 113. In 2013, Plaintiff, who owned property abutting lot 113, sought a declaratory judgment that lot 113 was not a grandfathered nonconforming lot. Reece subsequently acquired lot 114. The superior court granted summary judgment for Reece. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that Reece’s recombination of lots 113 and 114 did not effect a resurrection of the grandfathered status that the lots had when they were previously merged. View "Day v. Town of Phippsburg" on Justia Law

In May 2010, the Bar Harbor Appeals Board issued two decisions requiring the Bar Harbor Planning Board to approve a site plan for construction of a hotel on land abutting land owned by the Witham Family Limited Partnership in Bar Harbor. Witham filed a complaint challenging both decisions. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s judgment dismissing the complaint and remanded. Also in May 2010, on remand from the Appeals Board, the Planning Board issued a decision containing new findings and approving of the proposed site plan. No appeal was taken from this decision. In May 2012, the Planning Board approved of an amended site plan. Witham did not appeal from the May 2012 decision or the issuance of any building permits or other permits. In October 2013, on remand from the Supreme Court, the Business and Consumer Docket justice affirmed the Planning Board’s determinations. Witham appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot because Witham did not appeal from the Planning Board’s May 2010 decision approving the proposed site plan or the Planning Board’s May 2012 approval of an amended site plan and because the hotel was now fully operational. View "Witham Family Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Bar Harbor" on Justia Law

Christopher MacMahon and Elizabeth Tinkham, who had two daughters together, divorced in 2009. McMahon was granted primary physical residence of the girls, but no child support was awarded to either party. In 2012, the district court entered a modified judgment of parental rights and responsibilities requiring Tinkham to pay child support to MacMahon. MacMahon later filed a motion for contempt, alleging that Tinkham failed to pay the ordered child support. The court ultimately denied the motion for contempt, determining that MacMahon had not met his burden of proving that Tinkham had the present ability to pay child support and was wilfully avoiding her obligation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence in the record was sufficient to support the court’s determination that MacMahon had not proved contempt by clear and convincing evidence. View "MacMahon v. Tinkham" on Justia Law

Mother and Father were the biological parents of a daughter born in 2010. The district court awarded primary residence of the child to Mother, who intended to move to Florida with the child. Father appealed, contending, inter alia, that the district court erred by not considering the statutory protections afforded to him pursuant to the Maine Medical Use of Marijuana Act (MMUMA) when it determined custody. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the custody award did not run afoul of the statutory protections identified in MMUMA because the court’s factual findings did not rely on Father’s legal marijuana use but on his distraction and impairment while parenting; and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion in granting primary residence to Mother and allowing her to relocate to Florida. View "Daggett v. Sternick" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with unlawful trafficking of scheduled drugs and seeking criminal forfeiture of cash discovered during the search of his vehicle by Maine Drug Enforcement Agency (MDEA) agents. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence gathered from the search. The suppression court denied the motion, concluding that MDEA had sufficient probable cause to search the vehicle based on the totality of the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant failed to show his reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the search. View "State v. Lovett" on Justia Law

In 2012, Maria Viola filed for divorce from Gordon Viola. The district court entered a divorce judgment ordering Gordon to pay spousal support and attorney fees to Maria. The court also divided the marital assets and debts. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the judgment regarding attorney fees, holding that the award was not justified by the record; and (2) affirmed the judgment in all other respects, holding that the divorce court did not err in its award of spousal support or in its division of marital property. Remanded for reconsideration and clarification of the judgment as it related to Gordon’s obligation to pay all or some of the attorney fees incurred by Maria. View "Viola v. Viola" on Justia Law

In 2006, Patricia Voter and Dexter Voter divorced. The divorce judgment required Dexter to pay Patricia general spousal support in a certain amount per month until he retired, when the amount of his spousal support obligation would become one-half of his “retirement earnings.” When Dexter retired in 2013, he filed a post-judgment motion to modify the amount of support, alleging a change of circumstances because he was no longer employed. The court issued a written order clarifying the judgment by defining “retirement earnings” as used in the judgment. After a hearing, the court denied the motion to modify. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err when it clarified the spousal support provisions of its own judgment; and (2) the court’s decision to deny Dexter’s motion to modify was not an abuse of discretion. View "Voter v. Voter" on Justia Law

Father killed Mother in their oldest son’s immediate presence. The probate court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 22 Me. Rev. Stat. 4055(1)(B)(2)(a). The court presumed jeopardy against Father with respect to the oldest son based on its finding that Father acted in callous disregard for his son’s emotional well-being and had failed to protect his son from “a profound emotional injury” in a manner that was heinous and abhorrent to society. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the presumption of jeopardy does not apply only when a parent inflicts physical harm upon a child and that the presumption was applicable in this case. View "In re J.H." on Justia Law

When the father of Daniel Albert and Carlton Albert died, the father’s company was left in trust for the benefit of Daniel and Carlton. In 1984, Daniel bought the land from company and later conveyed it to Carlton in exchange for Carlton’s shares in the company. In 1992, Daniel purchased the land from Carlton and, in turn, released Carlton from his debt on a loan Daniel had previously extended to him. In 2010, Carlton commenced this action seeking imposition of a constructive trust on the land, alleging that, at the time of the 1992 land transfer, Daniel breached a confidential relationship existing between them. The trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err (1) in finding that Daniel and Carlton did not have a confidential relationship at the time of the land conveyance; and (2) in concluding, alternatively, that even if a confidential relationship did exist, the 1992 land transaction was free of any undue influence affecting Carlton’s interests. View "Albert v. Albert" on Justia Law

In 2010, Gregory Sullwold died of a heart attack while exercising on a treadmill in his home. Sullwood was employed by the Salvation Army at the time of his death, and the Salvation Army permitted Sullwold to work remotely from home. In 2011, Sullwold’s widow filed a petition for award of compensation, alleging that Sullwold’s work resulted in his heart attack. The Workers’ Compensation Board granted the petition. A hearing officer reaffirmed the original order, finding that work stress was a major factor in Sullwold’s death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing officer (1) did not err in finding that the evidence triggered the presumption found in 39-A Me. Rev. Stat. 327, which provides that an employee covered by the Maine Workers’ Compensation Act must be paid compensation if he or she receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment; and (2) did not erroneously shift the burden of persuasion to the Salvation Army in this case. View "Sullwold v. Salvation Army" on Justia Law