Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of numerous crimes, including two counts of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs. The charges stemmed from events that occurred on four different dates - three dates in July and August 2012 and one date in September 2012. On appeal, Defendant argued that the superior court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever the counts arising from the July and August events from the counts arising from the September events. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that that superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant relief from joinder, as, under the circumstances of this case, Defendant failed to make the necessary showing of unfair prejudice required to warrant severance. View "State v. Olmo" on Justia Law

Testa’s, Inc. and Jack and Sherri Coopersmith owned property on the westerly side of Main Street in Bar Harbor. The Coopersmiths owned two contiguous parcels that abutted Testa’s parking lot. In 1978, Testa’s granted the Coopersmiths predecessors-in-title an appurtenant easement over its property. In 2010, Testa’s sued the Coopersmiths seeking a declaratory judgment that the Coopersmiths did not have a right of way over its property. The trial court found that the 1978 agreement was enforceable and created an easement and, alternatively, that the Coopersmiths had a prescriptive easement over Testa’s property. The Supreme Court affirmed without reaching the parties’ prescriptive-easement arguments, holding that the trial court properly concluded that the 1978 agreement was enforceable against Testa’s and granted an appurtenant easement. View "Testa's, Inc. v. Coopersmith" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated trafficking in scheduled drugs, among other crimes. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (2) the State proved all of the elements of aggravated trafficking where the parties signed a stipulation as to Defendant’s prior conviction for a similar offense but the State failed to formally introduce the stipulation on the record; and (3) the trial court committed plain error by instructing the jury that it did not have to find that the manufacturing process had been completed in order to convict Defendant of the trafficking offense, but the error did not constitute obvious error. View "State v. Fox" on Justia Law

In 2013, the district court entered a judgment granting a divorce to Jeff Emerson and Patricia Bonner. Bonner subsequently filed motions for post-judgment relief pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 120 seeking enforcement of the divorce judgment. Emerson filed his own post-judgment motion pursuant to Rule 120 seeking enforcement. The district court employed the “applicable body of law relating to a [Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion]” and, sua sponte, amended the judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment because the court amended the judgment without the authority to do so. Remanded for reconsideration. View "Bonner v. Emerson" on Justia Law

Mother, who was from Italy, married Father, and the parties had one child. Father later filed for divorce. The district court entered a divorce judgment finding that, while the parties were both in Maine, it was in the child’s best interest to remain in the primary custodial care of Mother. The court also ordered that, if Mother relocated to Italy, primary residence would shift to Father so the child could remain in Maine. The court also divided the marital real estate, financial assets and debts. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that the district court (1) did not limit Mother’s constitutional right to travel or deprive Mother of her liberty without due process when balancing the parents’ and the child’s rights and interests in reaching its judgment; (2) did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen the evidentiary record to allow Mother to present evidence of the parties’ changed residential circumstances and work prospects; and (3) erred in failing to allocate Father’s deferred compensation account to one party or the other after determining it had no marital value. View "Light v. D'Amato" on Justia Law

Thomas Cabatit was survived by two sons, Jerediah and Joseph, who were given equal shares of Thomas’s Estate after his death. In his will, Thomas designated his sister, Julibel, as the personal representative of his Estate. Julibel subsequently retained Steven Canders and Maine Legal Associates, P.A. (collectively, MLA) to represent her in probate of the Estate. Jerediah and Joseph later filed a petition to surcharge Julibel and remove her as personal representative, alleging mismanagement of the Estate. The probate court removed Julibel and designated Joseph as the successor personal representative. Thereafter, Joseph, in his capacities as a beneficiary and as the personal representative of the Estate, sued MLA, alleging that MLA breached duties it owed to the Estate and to Joseph as a beneficiary by giving Julibel improper advice. The superior court granted summary judgment for MLA, concluding that the scope of the attorney-client relationship did not include a duty to the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) no attorney-client relationship existed between Joseph in his role as successor personal representative of the Estate and MLA; and (2) MLA did not owe a duty to Joseph as a nonclient. View "Estate of Cabatit v. Canders" on Justia Law

The trial court revoked Defendant’s probation based on findings that Defendant committed the new crimes of burglary and theft. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting, for the purpose of revoking Defendant’s probation, a police officer’s testimony about Defendant’s confessions despite the fact that the statements were obtained in violation of the procedural safeguards established to protect an individual’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to probation revocation proceedings unless the probationer presents proof of widespread police harassment or other proof of a serious due process violation. View "State v. Johansen" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded not guilty to passing a stopped school bus in violation of 29-A Me. Rev. Stat. 2308(2). After a bench trial, the trial court found Defendant guilty and imposed a $250 fine. Defendant filed a motion for findings of fact, which was denied. Defendant then appealed, arguing that “meeting or overtaking a school bus from either direction” means that the statute’s commend to stop applies when a school bus is approached from the front or the rear but not when the bus is approached from the side at a "T" intersection, as occurred in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not err in rejecting Defendant’s interpretation of the statute and in finding Defendant guilty as charged. View "State v. Mourino" on Justia Law

After a hearing, the district court issued a protection from abuse order against Father, finding that he had sexually abused his five-year-old daughter, ordering that he have no contact with her, and temporarily awarding sole parental rights and responsibilities to Mother. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of statements that the victim made to a social worker during therapy identifying Father as her abuser; (2) the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of statements the victim made during a forensic interview; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to support the court’s finding of abuse. View "Walton v. Ireland" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to stealing drugs, and judgment was entered accordingly. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) the court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress her confession, which was made to police during a voluntary polygraph, as the Defendant’s right to counsel in a separate, prior prosecution did not apply to interrogations arising out of the subsequently, separately alleged offenses; and (2) the pre-charge interrogation regarding the new criminal conduct that gave rise to the current prosecution was not a “critical stage” of the prosecution for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. View "State v. Babb" on Justia Law