Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Michael Doyle submitted to the Town of Falmouth a request pursuant to the Freedom of Access Act (FOAA) seeking to inspect certain cellular telephone bills of the School Department’s former Superintendent. The former Superintendent provided the requested records but redacted the information she considered nonpublic and confidential, exempt from disclosure pursuant to the FOAA, or beyond the scope of Doyle’s request. Doyle appealed, alleging that he was entitled to received unredacted copies of the cellular telephone records. After an in camera review of the unredacted records, the superior court entered judgment in favor of the Town and School Department. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the personal telephone numbers of public employees, any information concerning calls other than those related to the Town’s business, and any records containing information about parents’ and students’ telephone numbers were properly redacted from the Town’s response to the FOAA request. View "Doyle v. Town of Falmouth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted for operating after revocation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as amended, holding (1) any error by the trial court in refusing to instruct the jury about certain statutory requirements applicable to written notices of revocation was harmless; and (2) even if the State improperly offered and used documents that Defendant alleged were not properly identified as part of an exhibit but nonetheless were presented to the jury did not rise to the level of obvious and reversible error. Remanded for correction of an improper statutory reference in the judgment and commitment order. View "State v. Garcia" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the boundary separating the parties’ parcels of land and the ownership of an eleven-acre triangular area of land. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint seeking to quiet title to the disputed area and alleging claims of trespass and slander of title. Defendants counterclaimed. The trial court entered judgment (1) in favor of Plaintiff on her claims of adverse possession and acquiescence, on Plaintiff's common law trespass claim, and on all of Defendant’s counterclaims, and (2) in favor of Defendants on each of the remaining claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) determining that Plaintiff had established the elements of adverse possession; (2) rejecting Plaintiff’s slander of title claim and statutory trespass claim pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 7551-B; and (3) refusing to award treble damages pursuant to 14 Me. Rev. Stat. 7552(4)(B). View "Harvey v. Furrow" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the boundary between land owned by the parties to this case and an area of land with disputed ownership. Christopher and Diana Grondin filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment establishing the common boundary between their property and the property owned by Susan Hanscom. Hanscom filed a counterclaim also seeking a declaratory judgment as to the common boundary and alternatively seeking title to the disputed area through the doctrines of acquiescence and adverse possession. The superior court declared that the properties’ boundaries were as indicated on a certain survey, concluded that Hanscom had not gained title by acquiescence, and found only partially in Hanscom’s favor on her claim of adverse possession. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Marchese survey was sound in law and fact, and the superior court was free to accept its findings; (2) the superior court did not err in determining that Hanscom had not obtained title to the disputed area by acquiescence; and (3) the superior court did not err in finding that Hanscom had sustained her adverse possession claim only in part. View "Grondin v. Hanscom" on Justia Law

From 2002 to 2012, Defendant leased from Plaintiff business premises located in Portland. In 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Defendant had breached certain provisions in the written lease. Defendant counterclaimed, alleging that Plaintiff had failed to perform certain repairs required by the lease. The parties went to mediation on their dispute and reached a settlement agreement through that mediation. Defendant later moved to amend its original counterclaim to add a second count for breach of the settlement agreement. The superior court concluded that the counterclaim seeking to enforce the settlement was moot because Plaintiff signed an agreement reflecting all of the terms of the settlement reached through mediation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff executed a general release that complied with the agreement reached through mediation, the superior court correctly determined that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim seeking to enforce the settlement agreement was moot. View "2301 Congress Realty, LLC v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a private road that provided access to sixteen parcels of property. In 2003, residents who lived along the road formed a road association pursuant to the Private Ways Act. At the association’s first meeting, a road commissioner was elected, and all of the attendees, including Defendant, signed a Road Maintenance Agreement agreeing to divide maintenance costs of the road. Defendant never paid any of the bills he received from the association. In 2009, the road commissioner filed a claim against Defendant seeking payment of assessments dating back to 2005. The district court entered judgment for the commissioner. Defendant appealed. A jury returned a verdict in the commissioner’s favor, and the court entered judgment in the amount of $6,000. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the association was not eligible to make assessments for the years in question because it failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Private Ways Act. View "Sunshine v. Brett" on Justia Law

Cynthia Stacey-Sotiriou and Eve Sotiriou were the legal parents of a child born in 2006. In 2008, Cynthia and Eve jointly adopted the child. The parties’ relationship ended soon thereafter. In 2009, Cynthia filed a petition for the determination of parental rights and responsibilities. Eve then moved to Greece with the three-year-old child, indicating that she would not return with the child unless Cynthia agreed to allowing Eve to have primary residence. The district court entered a judgment establishing shared parental rights and responsibilities. Cynthia subsequently filed a motion to modify the judgment as well as a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), alleging that she had agreed to the judgment under duress. The district court granted both motions and awarded Cynthia primary residence of the child and Eve unsupervised contact with the child. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its award of rights of contact, including unsupervised contact, to Eve. View "Stacey-Sotiriou v. Sotiriou" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a construction company, filed a five-count complaint in superior court against Defendants, alleging breach of contract, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Prompt Payment Act. In the fifth count of the complaint, Plaintiff sought enforcement of a mechanic’s lien it recorded against Defendants’ property. Plaintiff then moved for summary judgment on its claims for breach of contract, violation of the Prompt Payment Act, and enforcement of the mechanic’s lien. The superior court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff on those three counts but made no mention of Plaintiff’s quantum meruit or unjust enrichment claims. Defendants appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory, as there was no final judgment on any of Plaintiff’s causes of action where two of Plaintiff’s claims were still pending. View "Warren Constr. Group, LLC v. Reis" on Justia Law

Defendant was at the place of his employment when his employer asked him to submit to a breath test. The results from the employer’s self-contained portable breath-alcohol testing device showed that Defendant had indicators of alcohol in his system, and Defendant was sent home on unpaid leave. Defendant was driving his van after leaving his place of employment when he was stopped and arrested. A police officer administered several field sobriety tests after stopping Defendant. Defendant was subsequently charged with driving under the influence. Before trial, the court granted the State’s motion in limine to exclude any evidence of the workplace breath-alcohol test to challenge the accuracy of the State’s intoxilyzer test. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge then appealed the order on the motion in limine. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that Defendant was entitled to challenge the reliability of the test results offered by the State by any appropriate means that is otherwise admissible in evidence, and thus the trial court denied Defendant the opportunity to make a formal offer of proof by excluding evidence of the workplace breath-alcohol test. View "State v. Adams" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with three Class E offenses. Defendant posted $500 cash bail in those matters and was assigned an attorney after the court found him indigent. While released on bail, Defendant was indicted on aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs. Defendant moved for an assignment of counsel in the aggravated trafficking matter. The court granted the motion and ordered that the $500 bail he previously posted be applied to his attorney fees. Following an appeal in which Defendant was represented by his court-assigned attorney, the Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s conviction, and Defendant was acquitted of the aggravated trafficking charge. Defendant’s Class E charges were ultimately dismissed. Defendant then requested the return of his $500 cash bail in the Class E matters. The motions were denied on the grounds that the bail had been applied to counsel fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that even though Defendant was eventually acquitted of the aggravated trafficking charge and his other charges were dismissed did not mean he was relieved of his obligation to pay the ordered portion of his attorney fees. View "State v. Lowden" on Justia Law