Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a termination hearing, the district court terminated Father’s parental rights to his child on the grounds that Father was unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child in a time frame calculated to meet the child’s needs and that the termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Father’s counsel subsequently filed an appellate brief containing only a procedural history and statement of facts, accompanied by a motion for enlargement of time to allow Father personally to file a supplemental brief. The Supreme Court granted the motion, but Father did not file a supplemental brief by the deadline provided. The Court affirmed, holding (1) the process utilized by Father’s counsel in this appeal was proper; and (2) the district court did not err in finding that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. View "In re M.C." on Justia Law

David Fleming, a prisoner at the Maine State Prison, filed a complaint seeking review of a decision of the Department of Corrections not to return items to him that he claimed were stolen from him. Because Fleming did not file any proof of service demonstrating compliance with 5 Me. Rev. Stat. 11003, the superior court dismissed Fleming’s complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the matter after Fleming failed to file proof of service during the time available to him after his initial filing of a complaint. View "Fleming v. Dep’t of Corr." on Justia Law

Northern Maine Transport, LLC (NMT), a Maine limited liability company with only two members, including Paul Beaudry, was administratively dissolved in 2009. In 2012, Beaudry filed this action, individually and purportedly on behalf of NMT, against Alan Harding and Hardings Law Offices for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in 2010 when Harding represented NMT and possibly Beaudry in facilitating a settlement with a third party. The superior court granted Harding’s motion for summary judgment, concluding (1) Beaudry lacked the legal capacity to bring suit on behalf of the administratively dissolved LLC or derivatively, and (2) Beaudry had no individual claim because he suffered no personal harm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Maine law did not permit Beaudry to proceed on behalf of the administratively dissolved LLC under these circumstances, either through a derivative action or individually. View "Beaudry v. Harding" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of the murder of the mother of his child. Appellant was sentenced to fifty-five years in prison and ordered to pay restitution. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Appellant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction review, alleging that the trial court violated his right to a public trial. The post-conviction court denied the motion, concluding that Appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was not violated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by agreeing to the process of conducting certain aspects of voir dire in chambers, and appellate counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to raise Appellant’s Sixth Amendment claim on direct appeal; (2) the policy of prohibiting spectators from wearing certain types of apparel in the courthouse did not constitute a partial closure of the courtroom; (3) the trial court’s decision to prohibit members of the public from entering the courtroom during witness testimony did not constitute a partial closure; and (4) the post-conviction court properly found that the public was not excluded from the announcement of the verdict. View "Roberts v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of assault and domestic violence assault and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. The convictions stemmed from an altercation Defendant had with his fourteen-year-old son. Defendant appealed, arguing that his conviction should be vacated the State did not produce sufficient evidence to overcome the “parental-control” justification, under which parents may use a “reasonable degree of force” in disciplining their children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial for the jury to rationally conclude that Defendant’s actions exceeded the bounds of parental discipline and became criminal in nature. View "State v. Treadway" on Justia Law

Gina Turcott filed a complaint for injunctive relief against the Humane Society Waterville Area (HSWA) seeking the release of HSWA records relating to a certain cat. The complaint further alleged that Turcott had submitted a request for documents to HSWA pursuant to Maine’s Freedom of Access Act (FOAA) and that HSWA had wrongfully withheld the requested records. The superior court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, although HSWA performs a function that benefits the public and assists municipalities, HSWA is not a public agency subject to the requirements of FOAA. View "Turcotte v. Humane Soc’y Waterville Area" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Town of Arundel reissued a conditional use permit to Dubois Livestock, Inc. In 2012, the Town’s code enforcement officer issued to Dubois a notice of violation for failure to comply with the conditional use permit. The Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) upheld the code enforcement officer’s notice of violation because Dubois admitted to violating the conditions of the 2011 permit. Dubois appealed, arguing that the Town did not have the authority to regulate Dubois’s operation because the Town of Arundel Land Use Ordinance was preempted by state law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that state law does not preempt the Ordinance, and therefore, the Town’s action taken pursuant to the Ordinance in issuing Dubois a notice of violation for failure to comply with the conditional use permit was not ultra vires or beyond the Town’s jurisdiction. View "Dubois Livestock, Inc. v. Town of Arundel" on Justia Law

Father and Mother divorced in 2010. In the divorce judgment, the district court awarded sole parental rights and responsibilities along with primary residential care of the parties’ son to Mother and granted Father visitation rights. Father filed several post-judgment motions related to his contact with his son. In 2013, the district court denied Father increased contact with his son, finding, among other things, that Father had not successfully completed the Violence No More program. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that some of the district court’s findings were not supported by competent evidence, and the errors were not harmless. Remanded. View "Remick v. Martin" on Justia Law

The Town of Madawaska filed an amended land use citation and complaint against Richard and Ann Cayer for violations of a shoreland zoning ordinance. The Cayers filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the land use citation was a retaliatory effort by the Town to punish them for exercising their right to petition local government. The trial court denied the special motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, except possibly in extraordinary circumstances not presented in this case, the anti-SLAPP statute cannot be invoked to thwart a local government enforcement action commenced to address the defendants’ alleged violations of law. View "Town of Madawaska v. Cayer" on Justia Law

Margaret Gray died in 2007, leaving a will that devised her estate to her surviving children, Ernest Gray and Elizabeth Tasker. In 2011, Elizabeth filed a claim against the estate seeking reimbursement for payments she made to maintain her mother’s properties since 2007. The probate court ordered that the estate pay Elizabeth $45,419. The Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions to apply 18-A Me. Rev. Stat. 3-803(b), the applicable statute of limitations. On remand, Elizabeth argued that the court should allow her claim against the estate based on a theory of unjust enrichment, which, she argued, would fall outside of the scope of the statute. The court concluded that Elizabeth’s claim was time-barred pursuant to section 3-803(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the time limitations established in section 3-803(b) for a claim against an estate apply to a claim for unjust enrichment, and therefore, Elizabeth’s claim was time-barred. View "In re Estate of Gray" on Justia Law