Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Mother relocated to North Carolina, Mother and Father, who were divorced, litigated the issue of whether their child’s primary physical residence would be in Maine or North Carolina. The district court ordered that the child was to live primarily in Maine with Father and that Mother pay child support to Father. The parties then began disputing travel costs. In 2011, the court amended the judgment to provide that the child’s travel expenses “shall be reflected as a 50% credit against [Mother’s] child support obligation.” In 2013, Mother filed a motion “to enforce and clarify” the judgment, requesting that the court amend the 2011 order so as to give her credit against her child support obligation based on the amount of her own travel expenses. The court denied the motion, finding it to be “frivolous,” and awarded Father attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the motion was frivolous and imposing sanctions. View "Tuell v. Nicholson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendant, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, conversion, and related claims. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, but the copy she filed had a photocopied rather than an original signature. By rule, Plaintiff was deemed to have waived all objections to the motion, and Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint was granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint because Plaintiff’s tendered objection did not have legal effect, and therefore, the trial court was authorized to grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss without reaching the merits of the motion. View "Petit v. Lumb" on Justia Law

Passadumkeag Windpark, LLC (PW) sought approval to construct a wind farm on property owned by Penobscot Forest, LLC (PF) located in Grand Falls Township. The Department of Environmental Protection denied the requested permit. On review, the Board of Environmental Protection (Board) granted the permit. Passadumkeag Mountain Friends (PMF), a Maine nonprofit corporation, and Alexander and Rhonda Cuprak appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board, holding (1) the decision of the Board was operative for purposes of appellate review; (2) the Board’s findings and conclusion were supported by substantial evidence in the record; and (3) certain communications between the Board, PW, and PF during the application process did not affect the Cupraks’ due process rights. View "Passadumkeag Mountain Friends v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Sarah Craig, individually and on behalf of her two children, filed a complaint for protection from abuse alleging that Krystal Gayle Caron, the ex-wife of Craig’s boyfriend, came into her home and hit her. The trial court found that Caron had stalked Craig and entered an order of protection from abuse. Caron appealed, arguing that the district court erred in entering the judgment because Craig and her children were not family or household members or dating partners of Caron and because her conduct did not constitute stalking. The Supreme Court agreed with Caron and vacated the judgment, holding that because the parties were not family or household members or dating partners, and because Caron’s conduct did not fall within the definition of stalking pursuant to the protection from abuse statute, the statute did not authorize the entry of a protection from abuse judgment for Craig and her children. View "Craig v. Caron" on Justia Law

32 Thomas Street, LLC applied to the Portland City Council for conditional rezoning of its property in Portland’s West End. The City Council ultimately approved the conditional zoning agreement (CZA) for the reuse and rehabilitation of the property. The superior court determined that the rezoning did not comply with the City’s comprehensive plan and state statutes limiting conditional rezoning. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded with direction to affirm the decision of the City Council, holding that the record before the City Council supported its legislative determination that the CZA was consistent with the comprehensive plan and therefore did not violate relevant state statutes. View "Remmel v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

In 2004, Charles Adams conveyed a portion of his parcel of property to himself and his sister, Dorothy Adams, as joint tenants. Dorothy subsequently executed a promissory note to American Bankers Conduit and conveyed a mortgage on her interest in the property as security on the note. Dorothy defaulted on the loan in 2008. In 2012, U.S. Bank sought to place an equitable lien on Charles’s interest in the property. After a trial, the superior court entered a judgment on the merits in favor of Charles. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for entry of dismissal, holding that because the complaint was not timely filed the action should have been dismissed pursuant to 14 Me. Rev. Stat. 752. Remanded. View "U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n as Trustee v. Adams" on Justia Law

After the City of Portland entered into negotiations to sell a portion of Congress Square Park (Park), an urban park in the City’s ownership, Friends of Congress Square Park (Friends) filed a citizens’ initiative to amend the City’s land bank ordinance, which would (1) create a new category of land bank property and designate certain parcels, including the Park, as belonging in that category; and (2) require approval of eight of nine City Council members to dispose of property in the land bank. The City declined to issue petition forms pursuant to the procedure set forth in section 9-36 of the City Code because, inter alia, the proposed amendments did not affect any legislative matters. The City Council subsequently approved the sale of a portion of the Park. On judicial review, the superior court concluded that the petition was a proper subject of a citizens’ initiative and entered a permanent injunction requiring the City to issue the petition forms. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the amendments proposed by Friends were within the scope of the citizens’ initiative power pursuant to section 9-36(a) of the City Code. View "Friends of Congress Square Park v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

Dozens of suits were filed against Irving Oil Limited (IOL) alleging environmental contamination by methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) occurring from 1979 to the present. At the time of this opinion, all of the MTBE suits against IOL had been settled. In 2009, IOL filed a complaint asking the superior court to declare that ACE INA Insurance (ACE) had a duty to defend and indemnify in the MTBE suits. The superior court granted IOL’s motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part, concluding that it could not declare that IOL was entitled a judgment on the duty-to-defend count as a matter of law. IOL appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed IOL’s appeal and ACE’s cross-appeal, holding that although a decision that an insurer does not have a duty to defend its insured is ordinarily immediately appealable under the death knell exception to the final judgment rule, the exception did not apply in this case because there were no MTBE cases pending against IOL.View "Irving Oil Ltd. et al. v. ACE INA Ins." on Justia Law

After the district court allocated primary residence of two minor children to Father, the children began residing with Father’s mother (“Grandmother”). Mother later sought primary residence and sole parental rights and responsibilities with regard to the children. In response, Grandmother filed a petition for de facto parental rights. The district court denied Grandmother’s petition, concluding that Grandmother failed to present sufficient evidence of her status as a de facto parent to establish that she had standing in a parental rights and responsibilities proceeding. Because the Supreme Court clarified, in Pitts v. Moore, the concepts necessary for a determination of de facto parenthood after the district court denied Grandmother’s petition, the Court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of the Court’s opinion in Pitts.View "Eaton v. Paradis" on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiff, frustrated with then-proposed budget cuts to mental health services, sent the Governor a series of emails that were interpreted as threatening. Plaintiff was delivered to MaineGeneral Medical Center for a psychiatric evaluation, where she was eventually subjected to a search and held against her will for the night in a locked room. Plaintiff later filed an action against MaineGeneral and Scott Kemmerer, an emergency room physician, alleging that Defendants deprived her of liberty without due process and subjected her to an unreasonable search in violation of the Maine Civil Rights Act (MCRA). Defendants filed for entry of summary judgment as to the MCRA claims. The court (1) granted the motion as to MaineGeneral, determining that MaineGeneral could not be held vicariously liable for the acts of its employees under the MCRA; and (2) denied the motion as to Kemmerer. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the denial of summary judgment as to Kemmerer on issues of immunity, holding that Kemmerer was not entitled to absolute immunity or common law qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s MCRA claims; and (2) did not reach Kemmerer’s remaining arguments in this interlocutory appeal. View "Clifford v. MaineGeneral Med. Ctr." on Justia Law