Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Father and Mother divorced in 2010. In the divorce judgment, the district court awarded sole parental rights and responsibilities along with primary residential care of the parties’ son to Mother and granted Father visitation rights. Father filed several post-judgment motions related to his contact with his son. In 2013, the district court denied Father increased contact with his son, finding, among other things, that Father had not successfully completed the Violence No More program. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that some of the district court’s findings were not supported by competent evidence, and the errors were not harmless. Remanded. View "Remick v. Martin" on Justia Law

The Town of Madawaska filed an amended land use citation and complaint against Richard and Ann Cayer for violations of a shoreland zoning ordinance. The Cayers filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the land use citation was a retaliatory effort by the Town to punish them for exercising their right to petition local government. The trial court denied the special motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, except possibly in extraordinary circumstances not presented in this case, the anti-SLAPP statute cannot be invoked to thwart a local government enforcement action commenced to address the defendants’ alleged violations of law. View "Town of Madawaska v. Cayer" on Justia Law

Margaret Gray died in 2007, leaving a will that devised her estate to her surviving children, Ernest Gray and Elizabeth Tasker. In 2011, Elizabeth filed a claim against the estate seeking reimbursement for payments she made to maintain her mother’s properties since 2007. The probate court ordered that the estate pay Elizabeth $45,419. The Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions to apply 18-A Me. Rev. Stat. 3-803(b), the applicable statute of limitations. On remand, Elizabeth argued that the court should allow her claim against the estate based on a theory of unjust enrichment, which, she argued, would fall outside of the scope of the statute. The court concluded that Elizabeth’s claim was time-barred pursuant to section 3-803(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the time limitations established in section 3-803(b) for a claim against an estate apply to a claim for unjust enrichment, and therefore, Elizabeth’s claim was time-barred. View "In re Estate of Gray" on Justia Law

After Mother relocated to North Carolina, Mother and Father, who were divorced, litigated the issue of whether their child’s primary physical residence would be in Maine or North Carolina. The district court ordered that the child was to live primarily in Maine with Father and that Mother pay child support to Father. The parties then began disputing travel costs. In 2011, the court amended the judgment to provide that the child’s travel expenses “shall be reflected as a 50% credit against [Mother’s] child support obligation.” In 2013, Mother filed a motion “to enforce and clarify” the judgment, requesting that the court amend the 2011 order so as to give her credit against her child support obligation based on the amount of her own travel expenses. The court denied the motion, finding it to be “frivolous,” and awarded Father attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the motion was frivolous and imposing sanctions. View "Tuell v. Nicholson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendant, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, conversion, and related claims. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, but the copy she filed had a photocopied rather than an original signature. By rule, Plaintiff was deemed to have waived all objections to the motion, and Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint was granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint because Plaintiff’s tendered objection did not have legal effect, and therefore, the trial court was authorized to grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss without reaching the merits of the motion. View "Petit v. Lumb" on Justia Law

Passadumkeag Windpark, LLC (PW) sought approval to construct a wind farm on property owned by Penobscot Forest, LLC (PF) located in Grand Falls Township. The Department of Environmental Protection denied the requested permit. On review, the Board of Environmental Protection (Board) granted the permit. Passadumkeag Mountain Friends (PMF), a Maine nonprofit corporation, and Alexander and Rhonda Cuprak appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board, holding (1) the decision of the Board was operative for purposes of appellate review; (2) the Board’s findings and conclusion were supported by substantial evidence in the record; and (3) certain communications between the Board, PW, and PF during the application process did not affect the Cupraks’ due process rights. View "Passadumkeag Mountain Friends v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Sarah Craig, individually and on behalf of her two children, filed a complaint for protection from abuse alleging that Krystal Gayle Caron, the ex-wife of Craig’s boyfriend, came into her home and hit her. The trial court found that Caron had stalked Craig and entered an order of protection from abuse. Caron appealed, arguing that the district court erred in entering the judgment because Craig and her children were not family or household members or dating partners of Caron and because her conduct did not constitute stalking. The Supreme Court agreed with Caron and vacated the judgment, holding that because the parties were not family or household members or dating partners, and because Caron’s conduct did not fall within the definition of stalking pursuant to the protection from abuse statute, the statute did not authorize the entry of a protection from abuse judgment for Craig and her children. View "Craig v. Caron" on Justia Law

32 Thomas Street, LLC applied to the Portland City Council for conditional rezoning of its property in Portland’s West End. The City Council ultimately approved the conditional zoning agreement (CZA) for the reuse and rehabilitation of the property. The superior court determined that the rezoning did not comply with the City’s comprehensive plan and state statutes limiting conditional rezoning. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded with direction to affirm the decision of the City Council, holding that the record before the City Council supported its legislative determination that the CZA was consistent with the comprehensive plan and therefore did not violate relevant state statutes. View "Remmel v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

In 2004, Charles Adams conveyed a portion of his parcel of property to himself and his sister, Dorothy Adams, as joint tenants. Dorothy subsequently executed a promissory note to American Bankers Conduit and conveyed a mortgage on her interest in the property as security on the note. Dorothy defaulted on the loan in 2008. In 2012, U.S. Bank sought to place an equitable lien on Charles’s interest in the property. After a trial, the superior court entered a judgment on the merits in favor of Charles. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for entry of dismissal, holding that because the complaint was not timely filed the action should have been dismissed pursuant to 14 Me. Rev. Stat. 752. Remanded. View "U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n as Trustee v. Adams" on Justia Law

After the City of Portland entered into negotiations to sell a portion of Congress Square Park (Park), an urban park in the City’s ownership, Friends of Congress Square Park (Friends) filed a citizens’ initiative to amend the City’s land bank ordinance, which would (1) create a new category of land bank property and designate certain parcels, including the Park, as belonging in that category; and (2) require approval of eight of nine City Council members to dispose of property in the land bank. The City declined to issue petition forms pursuant to the procedure set forth in section 9-36 of the City Code because, inter alia, the proposed amendments did not affect any legislative matters. The City Council subsequently approved the sale of a portion of the Park. On judicial review, the superior court concluded that the petition was a proper subject of a citizens’ initiative and entered a permanent injunction requiring the City to issue the petition forms. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the amendments proposed by Friends were within the scope of the citizens’ initiative power pursuant to section 9-36(a) of the City Code. View "Friends of Congress Square Park v. City of Portland" on Justia Law