Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of gross sexual assault, unlawful sexual contact, and furnishing liquor to a minor. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion in limine and motion to continue, both filed on the eve of trial; (2) the trial court did not err in allowing the State to participate in a pretrial hearing on those motions, as the State’s presence did not result in a premature disclosure of Appellant’s trial strategy; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions.View "State v. Dube" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Bangor Planning Board approved Harvey Sprague’s application to open and operate a quarry in Bangor’s rural residence and agricultural district. Sharon Cassidy sought judicial review of the Board’s decision, listing as one of the grounds for her appeal the Board’s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law to accompany its approval letter. The superior court accepted the findings of the Board retroactively and granted Cassidy forty days to consider the findings and file an amended brief in support of her appeal. Cassidy then filed this appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal because it was interlocutory and did not fall within any of the exceptions to the final judgment rule.View "Cassidy v. City of Bangor" on Justia Law

Clifford Lippitt was a certified geologist employed at S.W. Cole, Inc. Worcester Associates retained S.W. Cole to provide the necessary technical assistance in order to complete the closure of a landfill Worcester owned. After S.W. Cole drilled bedrock wells and collected data from them, Lippitt submitted a report presenting the results of the tests and concluding that there was no evidence the landfill was impacting neighboring residential wells. The Board of Certification for Geologists and Soil Scientists determined that Lippitt had violated the Code of Ethics applicable to geologists and soil scientists because he had provided a professional opinion “without being as thoroughly informed as might be reasonably expected.” The Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s judgment affirming the Board’s decision, holding (1) the Board’s disagreement with a geologist’s opinion, without a concurrent determination that the opinion is false, is based on false data, or reflects the geologist’s incompetence, cannot be the basis for a determination that the opinion constitutes a violation of the geologists’ Code of Ethics; and (2) the Board erred in determining that Lippitt violated the Code of Ethics on the grounds that Lippitt’s opinion was not “reasonable” in light of the underlying data.View "Lippitt v. Bd. of Certification for Geologists & Soil Scientists" on Justia Law

Richard Sullivan began sexually exploiting and abusing Jane Doe starting when Doe was approximately thirteen years old. When Doe was twenty years old, she gave birth to the parties’ daughter. Doe later filed a complaint for an order for protection from abuse, which the district court granted. Sullivan subsequently filed a complaint for a determination of paternity, parental rights and responsibilities, and child support obligations as to the child. The district court awarded sole parental rights and responsibilities to Doe with no rights of contact to Sullivan “at this time,” ordered that Sullivan may not have access to records and information about the child, and found that Sullivan owed Doe $38,019 in past child support. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that Sullivan posed a significant risk to minors, did not abuse its discretion in denying Sullivan rights of contact and access to the child’s records, and did not err in determining the amount of child support arrearages Sullivan owed Doe. View "Sullivan v. Doe" on Justia Law

In 2006, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. issued a mortgage to Robert Collopy, who transferred the mortgaged property to a trust. Collopy died later that year. In 2010, the Bank of New York Mellon, which had assumed trustee responsibility for administration of the mortgage, filed an action to foreclose on the mortgage, naming Collopy, in his individual capacity and as trustee of the trust, as the defendant. Collopy’s heir and co-trustee, Bobbie King, defended against the foreclosure action. In 2013, after an unfavorable ruling in the foreclosure action, the Bank filed a petition for the formal appointment of a special administrator to Collopy’s estate. The probate court dismissed the petition as untimely under Me. Rev. Stat. 18-A, 3-108(a), which prohibits the initiation of appointment proceedings more than three years after the decedent’s death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Bank’s petition was properly denied for having been filed outside the three-year limitations period in section 3-108(a). View "Estate of Collopy " on Justia Law

Edwina Jones rented a residence that she vacated in 2010. Because Jones did not replace heating oil in the residence’s oil tank at the end of her tenancy under the terms of the lease, Cost Management, Inc., the landlord, told Jones that it would return to Jones the $1,500 deposit minus $448, the cost of filling the oil tank. Jones filed a complaint against Cost Management asserting that she was entitled to $1,500, plus statutory double damages, attorney fees, interest and costs. Cost Management counterclaimed for the $448 it paid to fill the tank. The district court found in Jones’s favor on her complaint, found in favor of Cost Management on its counterclaim, and denied Jones’s claims for costs, double damages, and attorney fees under the wrongful-retention statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly found that Jones was entitled to receive $1,052 from Cost Management; and (2) because Cost Management overcame the presumption that it wrongfully withheld Jones’s security deposit, the district court did not err by not awarding court costs, double damages, and attorney fees.View "Jones v. Cost Mgmt., Inc." on Justia Law

Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC filed a complaint seeking a judgment of foreclosure against John and Cheryl Bartlett, alleging that the Bartletts had defaulted on a note secured by a mortgage on their home. After Bayview failed to appear at three mediation sessions, the district court dismissed Bayview’s complaint with prejudice, concluding that dismissal was the only appropriate sanction in light of Bayview’s pattern of disruptive behavior. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Bayview’s action with prejudice, as the district court understood the gravity of the sanction it was imposing, did not improperly rely on the Bartletts’ motions to dismiss, and correctly weighed the applicable facts in making its decision.View "Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Bartlett" on Justia Law

When Michael Lewis was sixteen years old, he was involved in a fatal car accident. At the time, Michael was driving a Ford pickup truck he had allegedly purchased from William Dodge. The other driver’s insurer paid Michael’s estate (Estate) its policy limit for liability. Michael’s mother, Angela, was insured by Concord General Mutual Insurance Company (Concord) at the time of the accident, and Michael’s father, David, was insured by Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (Allstate). The Concord and Allstate policies provided uninsured motorist (UM) benefits, as did Dodge’s policy with Property and Casualty Insurance Company of Hartford (Hartford). The Estate sought UM benefits from all three insurance companies. Each denied coverage, and the Estate filed suit against each company. The Superior court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether, pursuant to the agreement between Michael and Dodge, a final sale on the truck had been completed by the time of the accident. Remanded. View "Estate of Lewis v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Public Utilities Commission (Commission) approved, with multiple conditions, two petitions for reorganization filed by two regulated electrical utilities in Maine. The reorganization would allow changes in the corporate ownership of specific entities that transmit and distribute electricity in Maine such that they would be held in common ownership with generators of electricity in Maine, primarily, generators of electricity from wind power. Several intervenors appealed the Commission's approval of the petitions, arguing that the proposed union under a single ownership of transmission-and-distribution utilities and electricity generators was prohibited by the Electric Industry Restructuring Act. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the Commission, holding that the Commission incorrectly interpreted the Act in making its determination. Remanded for reexamination of the proposals to determine whether the Act permits the reorganization proposed in this case.View "Houlton Water Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n " on Justia Law

After Frederick McCollor died in 2010, Frederick’s wife, Patricia, brought suit against the couple’s children, John and Cheryl, for violation of the Improvident Transfers of Title Act (ITTA), undue influence, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty. The suit stemmed from actions John and Cheryl took at the end of Frederick’s life, including persuading Frederick and Patricia to transfer Frederick’s home to John and Cheryl and transferring over $22,000 from Frederick’s account to a joint account while John acted under a power of attorney obtained from Frederick five days after Frederick had a stroke. The superior court (1) concluded that the transfer of the real property was obtained through undue influence and was therefore void pursuant to the ITTA; (2) determined that John breached his fiduciary duty as the holder of Frederick’s power of attorney with regard to his transfer and use of Frederick’s money; and (3) ordered that the real property be held in constructive trust for the benefit of Frederick’s estate, and that John reimburse the estate in the amount of $22,000. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in its judgment. View "McCollor v. McCollor" on Justia Law