Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated attempted murder, arson, and burglary. The sentencing court sentenced Defendant to fifty years imprisonment for the aggravated attempted murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and the sentence, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that Defendant attempted to put another person’s spit into his mouth before submitting to a cheek swab for a DNA sample, and the State did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct; and (2) the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant, and a comparison of the gravity of the offense and the severity of Defendant’s sentence did not result in an inference of gross disproportionality.View "State v. Freeman" on Justia Law

Mother gave birth to a child in 2009. Mother arranged with a couple to adopt the child, and the couple was appointed the child’s temporary guardians (Guardians) while adoption proceedings commenced. However, subsequent genetic testing revealed that R.M. was the child’s father. The Guardians had filed a petition to terminate R.M.’s parental rights, which the probate court denied, concluding that the Guardians had not met their burden of proving that R.M. was unfit to parent the child. The probate court then ordered that the child be moved to Indiana, where R.M. lived. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the probate court did not err by concluding that the Guardians had not met their burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that R.M. was unfit to parent the child.View "In re Adoption of T.D." on Justia Law

Hancock Country Deputy Sheriff Christopher Sargent struck a deer with his patrol car while driving over the speed limit without cause. The County Commissioners voted to collect from Sargent the $1000 insurance deductible paid by the County for the damages to the patrol car. County Sheriff William Clark, Sargent, and the Union of which Sargent was a member (collectively, Plaintiffs) subsequently filed a Me. R. Civ. P. 80B appeal seeking judicial review of the Commissioners’ votes and seeking a declaration that the Commissioners exceeded their authority in requiring Sargent to pay the $1000 deductible. The Commissioners subsequently rescinded the votes seeking to collect the insurance deductible from Sargent. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, and the Commissioners field a cross-motion for summary judgment. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of the Commissioners, concluding that Plaintiffs’ Rule 80B appeal was moot and the request for a declaratory judgment was unripe. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Rule 80B appeal was moot and none of the recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied in this case; and (2) Plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment was unripe for judicial review because no genuine controversy existed.View "Clark v. Hancock County Comm’rs" on Justia Law

Ada Greenblatt died testate and without issue. Ada’s will did not provide instructions on how to distribute her residuary estate, which consisted primarily of real property and personal property, including a mizrah - an ornamental religious print - valued at $100. Ada’s brother, Owen Greenblatt, who was designated as a personal representative of Ada’s estate, selected the mizrah. When the personal representatives petitioned the probate court for an order completing settlement of the estate, Mark Levine, a residuary beneficiary of the estate, opposed the petition, claiming that Owen breached his fiduciary duty to the estate by taking the mizrah. The court entered a judgment completing settlement of the estate, finding that the distribution of the personal property was not improper. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the distribution scheme and Owen’s selection of the mizrah was not an abuse of the personal representatives’ discretion, and thus did not violate the fiduciary duty of impartiality.View "Estate of Greenblatt" on Justia Law

Vescom Corporation provided security services for a mill. Richard Hickson worked for Vescom at the mill. After then-Governor John Baldacci and his party visited the mill without wearing the proper footwear, Hickson sent the Governor an email expressing his concerns about the safety issues he noticed. Upon learning about the email, Vescom terminated Hickson’s employment. Hickson filed a complaint against Vescom. After a jury trial, the superior court found that Vescom had violated the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act by terminating Hickson’s employment. On appeal, Vescom argued that Hickson failed to make a protected whistleblower’s report because the conduct he reported was not undertaken by his employer, Vescom. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in the context of this case, Hickson’s report fell directly under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. View "Hickson v. Vescom Corp." on Justia Law

The Department of Health and Human Services initiated proceedings against Father with regard to his child, G.W. After a termination hearing, the district court determined that the Department had demonstrated all four statutory grounds for termination and that termination was in the best interest of the child. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) the district court did not violate Father’s due process rights by proceeding with the termination hearing without Father’s participation by telephone; and (2) the record contained sufficient evidence to support the district court’s finding that, by clear and convincing evidence, termination was in G.W.'s best interest.View "In re G.W." on Justia Law

After a hearing, the trial court granted Timothy Dalton and Sarah Dalton a divorce and awarded parental rights and responsibilities and primary residence of the children to Timothy. In the months following the divorce judgment, Sarah sought to collaterally attack the judgment by filing numerous post-judgment motions in an effort to modify the visitation and supervision arrangement in the judgment. After a hearing, the court denied or declared moot all of Sarah’s motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings during the hearing on Sarah’s post-judgment motions; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sarah’s motion for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law; and (3) the trial judge did not err in failing to sua sponte recuse himself from this matter. View "Dalton v. Dalton" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from two suits. Kelly, Remmel & Zimmerman (KRZ) filed suit alleging that Raisin Memorial Trust fraudulently transferred property to Samsara Memorial Trust. Samsara sued KRZ alleging slander of title and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. The superior court entered a judgment awarding damages to KRZ, concluding that the transfer of property from Raisin to Samsara was a fraudulent transfer. The trusts appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded for a determination of damages with respect to the trusts, holding (1) the trusts’ argument that the justice who presided over their case violated the Maine Code of Judicial Conduct because he did not recuse himself from the case or disclose to the parties that he had formerly served on the superior court with an individual who is now an attorney at KRZ was without merit; and (2) the court erred in awarding damages in the amount of $340,000 against the trusts pursuant to Maine’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. View "Samsara Memorial Trust v. Kelly, Remmel & Zimmerman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of knowing or intentional murder and sentenced to two concurrent sentences of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and sentence, holding (1) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the jury to find all of the elements of the crime charged; (2) the sentencing court did not misapply sentencing principles; and (3) the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that aggravating and mitigating factors did not require a departure from the basic sentence, and the court did not impermissibly or unconstitutionally impose a sentence that was more severe based upon Defendant’s exercise of his right to a trial.View "State v. Hayden" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs. The Supreme Court vacated the conviction, holding that the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal because the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict. Specifically, the record did not include sufficient evidence from which a jury rationally could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant successfully manufactured methamphetamine, a necessary element of unlawful trafficking in schedule W drugs. Remanded to the superior court for the entry of a judgment of acquittal.View "State v. Lowden" on Justia Law