Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of unlawful sexual contact, unlawful sexual touching, and two counts of assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in limiting Defendant’s cross-examination of the victims’ mother regarding sexual abuse that the mother experienced as a child; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial after a fragment of a police interview that the parties had agreed to redact was mistakenly played for the jury; (3) the trial court did not commit obvious error in failing to excuse or inquire further of a juror who worked for the same company as Defendant after finding that the juror and Defendant did not recognize each other; and (4) there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. View "State v. Logan" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) issued an order approving water quality certification (WQC) under the Clean Water Act for the continued operation of the Eel Weir Hydropower Project. The project includes Eel Weir Bypass, a stretch of water that connects Sebago Lake to the Presumpscot River. Douglas Watts, a recreational user of Sebago Lake and the Presumpscot River, appealed the WQC to the Maine Board of Environmental Protection (BEP). The BEP affirmed the DEP’s order. The Business and Consumer Docket affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the BEP did not err in approving the WQC and in finding that the WQC complies with Maine’s water quality standards governing the Eel Weir Bypass and Sebago Lake. View "Watts v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Defendant’s probation officer asked Defendant to come to the probation office. When Defendant complied, he met two state troopers who sat down with him and asked him about a theft at the victim’s apartment. After the interview, Defendant made incriminating statements. Defendant was charged with burglary and theft by unauthorized taking or transfer. Defendant moved to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement. The trial court determined that Defendant spoke voluntarily and that he was not in custody, and therefore, Miranda warnings were not required. Defendant was subsequently convicted of theft by unauthorized taking or transfer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in determining that Miranda warnings were unnecessary because Defendant was not in custody; (2) the trial court did not err in concluding that the confession was voluntary; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. View "State v. Kittredge" on Justia Law

Scott Greenleaf executed a promissory note to Residential Mortgage Services, Inc. (RMS). That same day, Greenleaf signed a mortgage on property securing that debt. The mortgage listed RMS as the lender of the debt and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as the nominee for the lender. MERS subsequently assigned its interest in the mortgage and note to Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP (BAC). BAC then merged with Bank of America, N.A. (Bank). Five years later, the Bank instituted foreclosure proceedings against Greenleaf. The district court entered a judgment of foreclosure in favor of the Bank. Greenleaf appealed, arguing that the Bank lacked standing to foreclose on the property. The Supreme Court agreed with Greenleaf and vacated the judgment, holding (1) the Bank proved its status as the holder of the note but failed to establish its ownership of Greenleaf’s mortgage; and (2) because the Bank failed to satisfy two of the Higgins foreclosure requirements, the Bank was not entitled to a judgment of foreclosure in any event. View "Bank of Am., N.A. v. Greenleaf" on Justia Law

Mother and Father were the parents of two young daughters. Father was psychologically abusive to the family, most particularly to Mother. When Father, who was not a dentist, expressed his intent to perform dental work one of his daughters, Mother left the home with the children and obtained a child protection order against Father. The district court subsequently found that Father had subjected the children to circumstances of jeopardy and found the existence of an aggravating factor as defined by 22 Me. Rev. Stat. 4002(1-B)(A)(1). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) appropriately considered Father’s past actions when it found that the children had been placed in circumstances of jeopardy; and (2) correctly found that Father’s abuse was chronic, heinous and abhorrent to society. View "In re E.L." on Justia Law

Glen Harrington pleaded guilty in 2012 to eluding an officer and admitted to violating the conditions of his probation. Harrington was sentenced to forty-eight months’ imprisonment. The Department of Corrections subsequently determined that Harrington was eligible to receive seven days per month of good-time credits and that Harrington would be eligible to receive an additional two days per month for participation in transition-plan programs. Harrington appealed this determination, arguing that he was entitled, for the entire duration of his sentence, to the two days per month for participation in transition-plan programs. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition on the basis that calculations of good time credits are not reviewable in post-conviction proceedings. Harrington appealed, arguing that his petition did not challenge a “calculation” of the credits but instead challenged the Department’s policy of making the credit available to only to inmates at a certain point in their sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the post-conviction court did not err in construing the Department’s decision as a calculation of good-time credits and dismissing Harrington’s petition. View "Harrington v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of elevated aggravated assault, burglary, and violation of a condition of release. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) admitting into evidence a witness’s videotaped interview with police; (2) excluding evidence of an alternative suspect; (3) imposing a significant sanction on the State for a discovery violation; (4) declining to instruct the jury that it could infer that evidence destroyed by the State was favorable to Appellant; and (5) declining to allow Appellant to play a 911 tape during his initial cross-examination of a police detective. Further, the State’s destruction of the victim’s clothing and failure to produce certain witness statements in discovery did not violate Defendant’s right to due process or deprive him of a fair trial. View "State v. Cruthirds" on Justia Law

Pike Industries operated a quarry in the City of Westbrook. Smiling Hill Farm owned property and operated businesses near Pike’s quarry. After the City concluded that Pike did not have a grandfathered right to quarry and attempted to rezone the property and end Pike’s quarrying operations, Pike filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the City from enforcing its zoning ordinances. The City and Pike subsequently entered into a consent decree that allowed Pike to continue its quarrying operations subject and established a set of governing performance standards. Smiling Hill appealed. In Pike I, the Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions for the parties to formalize the performance standards. The parties then entered into a second consent decree. Smiling Hill appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the decree conformed to the requirements laid out in Pike I; and (2) the decree did not result in a forfeiture of the City’s enforcement power or an illegal contract zone. View "Pike Indus., Inc. v. City of Westbrook" on Justia Law

In 2009, David and Debra Sawyer defaulted on a mortgage held by U.S. Bank N.A. In 2012, the Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure. At the time the complaint was filed, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A. had taken over as loan servicer. Four court-ordered mediations subsequently took place, during which time the Sawyers attempted to negotiate a modification with Chase. The mediations were unsuccessful, largely due to Chase’s repeated delays and requests to submit documentation that the Sawyers had already submitted. At a show cause hearing, the superior court subsequently dismissed the Bank’s complaint with prejudice, concluding that the Bank was not prepared to proceed at the hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the sanction was not excessive under the circumstances, and (2) there was evidence that the Sawyers were prejudiced by the Bank’s failure to participate in the mediation process in good faith. View "U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of failing to provide his correct, name, address, and date of birth; possession or distribution of dangerous knives; and refusing to submit to arrest or detention. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s conviction of failing to give his correct name, address, and date of birth but otherwise affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not violate Defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights at a suppression hearing by admitting testimony of police officers because the testimony was not hearsay; and (2) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction of failing to give his correct name, address, and date of birth. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law