Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

While Mother and S.S.’s divorce was pending, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition for a child protection order on behalf of K.S., Mother’s child, alleging that Mother and S.S. placed K.S. in jeopardy. The jeopardy hearing and divorce hearing were held at the same time. The district court subsequently entered an order awarding DHHS custody of K.S. and finding that S.S. (1) was K.S.’s de facto parent, (2) placed K.S. in jeopardy, and (3) was entitled to reunification services. Mother appealed, arguing that S.S. was not entitled to any reunification services or other rights regarding K.S. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as K.S.’s de facto parent, S.S. was entitled to the same rights as Mother, including reunification efforts; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of jeopardy. View "In re K.S." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant asserting multiple intentional torts and alleging that Defendant sexually assaulted Plaintiff in the early 1970s when Plaintiff was a child and Defendant was a Roman Catholic pastor. On remand, the superior court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that Plaintiff’s complaint was time-barred. At issue on appeal was whether the statute of limitations was tolled due to Defendant’s move to Massachusetts during the applicable time frame. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant established, without dispute of material facts, that he was amenable to service because Maine’s long-arm statute permitted service of the complaint in Massachusetts and that Plaintiff could have located him through reasonable effort and served him by any means other than publication. View "Angell v. Hallee" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of one count each of arson, burglary, aggravated criminal mischief, and theft. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal as to the arson conviction. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion and acquitted Defendant of the arson charge. The State appealed, arguing that there was sufficient evidence upon which a jury could have concluded that Defendant committed arson, either directly or as an accomplice. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of acquittal, holding that the trial court erred in entering the judgment of acquittal, as there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was an accomplice to arson. View "State v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife were married and had a daughter who was born in 2006. In 2009, Husband filed a complaint for divorce. In 2012, the family law magistrate appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for the child. In 2013, after a trial, the district court entered an amended divorce judgment awarding shared parental rights and responsibilities in most respects, allocating primary residence of the child to Husband, and ordering that Mother engage in post-judgment counseling with a counselor approved by the GAL. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the consent provision of Maine’s Interception of Wire and Oral Communications Act authorizes a parent to vicariously consent, on behalf of his or her minor child, to intercept the child’s oral or wire communications with another party when the parent has a good faith, objectively reasonable belief that it is necessary and in the child’s best interest to do so, and the record supported the district court’s determination that Father provided such vicarious consent in this case; and (2) the district court erred in ordering that the GAL continue services post-judgment to approve Mother’s counselor. View "Griffin v. Griffin" on Justia Law

In 2013, Defendant was tried on a charge of domestic violence assault. During the trial proceedings, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion for a mistrial after finding manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. Concluding that the mistrial did not involve prosecutorial misconduct, the trial court ruled that the State was entitled to retry its case. Defendant appealed, arguing that double jeopardy barred retrial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant consented to a mistrial, and because intentional prosecutorial misconduct did not bar a retrial, there was no barrier to retrial under the double jeopardy clause. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Securities Administrator of the Office of Securities revoked the securities licenses of North Atlantic Securities, LLC, a licensed broker-dealer, Michael J. Dell’Olio & Associates, a licensed investment adviser, and Michael Dell’Olio. Dell’Olio was an investment advisor representative of Michael J. Dell’Olio, an agent of North Atlantic, and an owner exercising control in both firms. The revocations resulted from transactions through which Dell’Olio, his son, and the two entities under Dell’Olio’s control received over $200,000 in loans from Dell’Olio’s mother-in-law, most of which were not repaid. The business and consumer docket affirmed the revocation of Appellants’ securities licenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the charges arising from transactions that occurred in 2006 were not time-barred; (2) the administrative record supported the Administrator’s factual findings; (3) the Administrator’s decision was not affected by structural or actual bias; and (4) despite the severity of the penalty imposed, the Administrator did not abuse her discretion in revoking the licenses. View "N. Atlantic Secs., LLC v. Office of Secs." on Justia Law

A Bank and Re/Max Realty One signed a listing agreement granting Re/Max the exclusive right to sell a certain property. A buyer signed a purchase-and-sale agreement with the Bank and paid $86,900 in earnest money, which Re/Max held in escrow. The buyer later defaulted under the terms of the agreement. Re/Max subsequently procured a second buyer to purchase the property. After participating in mediation, the Bank and the first buyer agreed the divide the earnest money between themselves, with $49,500 going to the Bank and $37,400 to the buyer. Re/Max sent a $37,400 check to the buyer and a check for $24,750 to the Bank, retaining the remaining $24,750. The Bank sued Re/Max for breach of the listing agreement stemming from Re/Max’s retention of $24,750 of the earnest money. The superior court granted summary judgment to the Bank. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that Re/Max was entitled to summary judgment on the Bank’s breach of contract claim because the unambiguous language of the listing agreement obligated the Bank to divide any forfeited earnest money with Re/Max, including money the Bank received pursuant to its mediated agreement with the first buyer. View "Bank of New York Mellon, N.A. v. Re/Max Realty One" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of assault on an officer and criminal mischief. Appellant appealed, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by electing not to make an opening statement, not cross-examining the State’s witnesses, not presenting any evidence for the defense, and presenting only a brief closing argument. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the issues Appellant raised regarding ineffective assistance of counsel were not properly raised on direct appeal and instead must be addressed in a fact-finding proceeding to determine if trial counsel’s action resulted from incompetence, appropriate strategic choices, or other considerations. View "State v. Troy" on Justia Law

In 2004, Paula Bratton and Daniel Hills and their children (“the Brattons”), moved into a house that they rented from Halsey McDonough. In 2008, the Department of Health and Human Services notified McDonough that he was required to relocate the Brattons because of numerous lead hazards throughout the rental property. The Brattons subsequently filed twelve-count complaint against McDonough. The trial court granted McDonough’s motion for judgment as a matter of law as to some of the Brattons’ claims and in favor of McDonough based on a jury verdict on the remaining claims. The Supreme Court vacated the jury’s verdict and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court clearly erred in excluding the Brattons’ qualified expert witness; (2) the trial court erred in entering judgment as a matter of law for McDonough on the negligence claims of the two older children, as well as the intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages claims of all three children; (3) the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof onto the Brattons to disprove McDonough’s independent causation theories and erred in refusing to give the jury a proper and requested instruction; and (4) the trial court’s errors created a fundamentally unfair trial. View "Bratton v. McDonough" on Justia Law

John and Jane Doe, the parents Susan Doe, a transgender girl, filed a complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission alleging that Regional School Unit 26 (RSU 26) had violated the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA) by excluding Susan from the communal girls’ bathroom at elementary and middle school. The Commission found reasonable grounds to believe discrimination had occurred. Thereafter, the Does and the Commission filed a complaint in the superior court asserting claims for unlawful discrimination in education (Count I) and unlawful discrimination in a place of public accommodation (Count II) on the basis of sexual orientation. The superior court granted RSU 26’s motion for summary judgment on all counts. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that where it has been clearly established that a student’s psychological well-being and educational success depend on being permitted to use the communal bathroom consistent with her gender identity, denying the student access to the appropriate bathroom constitutes sexual orientation discrimination in violation of the MHRA. Remanded for entry of summary judgment for the Does and the Commission. View "Doe v. Reg'l Sch. Unit 26" on Justia Law