Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
State of Maine v. Ellis
Raymond Ellis Jr. was convicted of robbery and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. On August 5, 2023, Ellis, armed with a handgun, and a juvenile accomplice, armed with a sawed-off shotgun, robbed the Big Apple convenience store in Madison. They wore masks, threatened the store clerk, and stole cash from the registers. A third person acted as a lookout. Ellis was sentenced to twenty-five years for robbery, with all but twenty years suspended, and four years of probation, plus a concurrent three-year term for the firearm possession charge.The jury found Ellis guilty of robbery, criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon, and theft by unauthorized taking. The court found him guilty of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person after Ellis waived his right to a jury trial on that count. The court merged the criminal threatening and theft counts with the robbery count for sentencing purposes. Ellis appealed, arguing entitlement to a missing-witness jury instruction and errors in the sentencing process.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. Ellis contended that the jury should have been instructed to infer that a missing witness would not have corroborated the State’s theory. The court reaffirmed its stance from State v. Brewer, holding that no such inference is permissible. The court also addressed Ellis’s claim of double-counting sentencing factors, noting that the sentencing court improperly considered Ellis’s failure to take responsibility as an aggravating factor. The court vacated Ellis’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, affirming the judgment of conviction in all other respects. View "State of Maine v. Ellis" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Smith v. Henson
Peter A. Smith visited Mercy Hospital twice in June 2017 with symptoms indicative of Lyme disease. Dr. John R. Henson misdiagnosed him on both occasions, leading to a lack of appropriate treatment. Smith subsequently developed Lyme carditis and died on July 2, 2017. His parents, Angela M. Smith and Richard T. Smith Jr., as co-personal representatives of his estate, filed a medical negligence lawsuit against Henson, Mercy Hospital, and Eastern Maine Healthcare Systems.The Superior Court (Cumberland County) ruled that Maine’s Wrongful Death Act allowed recovery for pecuniary injuries even if the decedent would not have provided financial support to the beneficiaries. A jury found the defendants liable and awarded damages, including $2 million for pecuniary injury to Smith’s parents, despite no evidence that Smith would have financially supported them.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court held that the applicable wrongful death statute authorized recovery for pecuniary injury only when the death deprived one or more of the people identified in the statute of prospective financial gain. The court concluded that damages for such a loss were not available when the loss was asserted only by the estate. Consequently, the court vacated the portion of the judgment awarding damages for pecuniary injury. All other aspects of the judgment were unaffected, and the case was remanded for entry of a modified judgment consistent with the opinion. View "Smith v. Henson" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury
Fratello v. Mann
Katherine Fratello loaned Russell A. Mann $60,000 under a secured promissory note, with Mann agreeing to make monthly payments starting October 15, 2023. Mann provided a cashier’s check for $3,500 on September 29, 2023, claiming it covered the first two payments and other loans. Fratello disputed the validity of the check and considered Mann in default for missing the first two payments. She served Mann with a default notice on November 29, 2023, and filed a complaint on January 5, 2024, alleging Mann’s failure to make the required payments.Mann counterclaimed, asserting that Fratello breached their contract by not cashing the cashier’s check, which he claimed covered the first two payments. He argued that Fratello’s refusal to accept the payment and the subsequent default notice were unlawful. Fratello filed a special motion to dismiss Mann’s counterclaim under Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the counterclaim was based on her protected petitioning activity, namely the default notice and the complaint.The Superior Court (Cumberland County) denied Fratello’s special motion to dismiss, concluding that the default notice was not petitioning activity and that Mann’s counterclaim was not based on Fratello’s filing of the complaint or any other petitioning activity. Fratello appealed the decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion de novo and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that Mann’s counterclaim was based on Fratello’s refusal to accept the cashier’s check, not on her petitioning activity. Therefore, Fratello did not meet her burden to demonstrate that Mann’s counterclaim was based on protected petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Fratello v. Mann" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Contracts
State of Maine v. Gleason
Rochelle Gleason was convicted of aggravated trafficking of a scheduled drug that caused the death of a person. In October 2021, Gleason communicated with the decedent about purchasing fentanyl and heroin. On October 16, 2021, the decedent bought drugs from Gleason, consumed them, and died of acute intoxication from fentanyl and kratom. The Maine Office of the Chief Medical Examiner sent a blood sample to a lab, where several employees conducted tests. A forensic toxicologist, Chelsea Deisher, reviewed the data and documentation and developed a toxicology report indicating the presence of fentanyl and kratom in the decedent’s blood.The State charged Gleason on September 28, 2022, and she pleaded not guilty. During the trial, Deisher testified about the test results, although she did not conduct the tests herself. Gleason objected, arguing that her Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against her was violated because she could not cross-examine the actual testers. The trial court allowed Deisher’s testimony, and the jury found Gleason guilty. She was sentenced to eighteen years in prison, with all but eight years suspended, and four years of probation. Gleason appealed the conviction.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case, focusing on the Confrontation Clause issue. The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Arizona, issued during the appeal, rejected the rationale that allowed experts to testify based on out-of-court statements not admitted for their truth. The court found that Deisher’s testimony relied on the truth of the data and documentation generated by others, which Gleason could not cross-examine. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial to determine whether the statements relied upon by Deisher were testimonial. View "State of Maine v. Gleason" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Barron v. Barron
Kathleen M. Barron filed for divorce from John D. Barron in April 2022. The District Court in Bangor held a contested bench trial where both parties testified and submitted evidence, including proposed calculations for the division of assets. The court ordered John to make a $57,790.17 payment to Kathleen to equalize the division of property, or the marital home, which also houses John's business, would be sold.John appealed the decision, arguing that the court did not make sufficient findings to support the equalization payment. He had filed a post-judgment motion for further findings of fact, which the trial court denied. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court noted that the divorce judgment lacked specific findings regarding the valuation and classification of assets, making appellate review impossible. The court highlighted that the trial court must provide express factual findings based on the record to support its decisions.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment in part and remanded the case for further findings. The court emphasized that the trial court must independently assess the valuation evidence before equitably dividing marital property. The judgment was vacated concerning the distribution of property, while the remainder of the judgment was affirmed. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, allowing the trial court discretion to reopen the evidence if necessary. View "Barron v. Barron" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law
State of Maine v. Robshaw
Aaron A. Robshaw was convicted by a jury in the Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket for gross sexual assault (Class A), unlawful sexual contact (Class A), and unlawful sexual contact (Class B) against a minor. The incidents occurred in 2018 and 2019 when the victim was ten and eleven years old. The victim disclosed the abuse to her mother in 2019 and fully revealed the extent of the abuse four years later. During the trial, the State presented expert testimony on child victims' delayed disclosure of sexual abuse, which Robshaw objected to, arguing it would improperly bolster the victim's credibility.The trial court allowed the expert testimony, and after the State rested its case, the court granted Robshaw’s motion for judgment of acquittal on one count of gross sexual assault. The jury found Robshaw guilty on the remaining counts. The court sentenced Robshaw to twenty years' imprisonment followed by twenty years of supervised release. Robshaw appealed the conviction and sentence, arguing improper admission of expert testimony, misapplication of the law in sentencing, and abuse of discretion in imposing supervised release.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony, as it was limited to general information about delayed disclosure and did not directly bolster the victim's credibility. The court also found that the trial court properly applied the sentencing analysis, setting the basic term of imprisonment at the legislatively mandated minimum of twenty years and considering aggravating and mitigating factors. The court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a twenty-year period of supervised release, as it appropriately considered the need to protect the public and Robshaw’s history of sexual offenses. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, sentence, and period of supervised release. View "State of Maine v. Robshaw" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
State of Maine v. Demerchant
Heath G. Demerchant was convicted of domestic violence assault (Class C) after a jury trial. The incident involved Demerchant grabbing his wife's throat and hitting her during an argument about a debit card. The State presented testimony from the victim, witnesses, and police officers. Demerchant argued that his actions were justified under the competing harms justification, claiming he was preventing imminent harm to another person.The trial court denied Demerchant's request for a jury instruction on the competing harms justification, finding insufficient evidence of imminent physical harm to another. The jury found Demerchant guilty, and he was sentenced to five years in prison, with all but three years suspended, and four years of probation.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that there was no evidence of a specific and imminent threat of physical harm to justify the competing harms instruction. The court emphasized that the justification requires evidence of an imminent threat, which was not present in this case. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the requested jury instruction. View "State of Maine v. Demerchant" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Stovall v. New England Telephone Company
In 1996, Katherine Stovall, while employed at New England Telephone Company, experienced pain in her hands and wrists due to a work-related injury. By 1998, the pain had spread, leading her to take a leave of absence. She returned to work in 1999 but ultimately stopped working in June 2001 due to increased pain. Stovall notified her employer of a new injury/aggravation in August 2001. In 2004, she filed petitions for benefits for both the 1996 and 2001 injuries. In 2006, a hearing officer awarded her benefits for the 2001 injury but not for the 1996 injury, which she had withdrawn.The Workers’ Compensation Board hearing officer found that the 2001 injury was a significant aggravation of the 1996 injury. In 2011, New England Telephone filed a petition to review the benefits, asserting that the 520-week limit on compensation payments had been reached. The hearing officer granted the petition, finding that Stovall had achieved maximum medical improvement and had no permanent impairment from the 2001 injury.Stovall filed a petition for restoration of benefits for the 1996 injury in 2017, nearly eleven years after payments for the 1996 injury had ceased. An ALJ denied the petition as time-barred, concluding that Stovall had not shown that New England Telephone was on notice that its payments for the 2001 injury were related to the 1996 injury. The Appellate Division vacated this decision, ruling that the payments for the 2001 injury tolled the statute of limitations for the 1996 injury.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Appellate Division's decision, holding that Stovall failed to prove that New England Telephone was on notice that its payments for the 2001 injury were related to the 1996 injury. The case was remanded for the Appellate Division to affirm the denial of Stovall’s petition as time-barred. View "Stovall v. New England Telephone Company" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Labor & Employment Law
State of Maine v. Lipscombe
Jarae Lipscombe was convicted by a jury of hindering apprehension or prosecution (Class B) for actions taken to delay or prevent the apprehension of his brother, who was later charged with homicide in Waterville. Lipscombe provided false information to the police and assisted his brother in avoiding capture. Five months after his conviction, Lipscombe moved for a new trial, arguing that his brother's acquittal of murder would likely lead to a different outcome in his own case. The trial court denied the motion, and Lipscombe appealed.The Kennebec County trial court held a three-day jury trial where Lipscombe's defense focused on his lack of knowledge regarding his brother's involvement in the homicide. The State presented evidence showing that Lipscombe gave a false description to the police, knew the police were seeking his brother, and made arrangements for his brother to stay at a friend's house. Additionally, Lipscombe confessed to witnessing his brother shoot the victim and offered money to retrieve the weapon. After the jury found Lipscombe guilty, he appealed the judgment, which was affirmed by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed Lipscombe's appeal of the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial. The court held that the acquittal of Lipscombe's brother was irrelevant to Lipscombe's conviction. The court explained that the statute defining hindering apprehension or prosecution does not require proof of the brother's guilt but rather that Lipscombe knew of his brother's conduct that could render him liable to a charge of murder. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the brother's acquittal did not change the factual circumstances of the conduct Lipscombe witnessed. View "State of Maine v. Lipscombe" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Newfield Sand v. Town of Newfield
Newfield Sand, a Maine corporation engaged in mineral extraction, owns a nearly three-hundred-acre parcel in the Town of Newfield. In 1994, the Planning Board granted a permit to the previous owner for a five-acre gravel-extraction operation with specific conditions on hours of operation and truck trips. Newfield Sand acquired the property in 1998 and sought to expand its operations. In May 2022, Newfield Sand applied for a conditional use permit to operate on thirty acres of open pit at a time and extract minerals from about eighty-five acres. The Planning Board approved the application in November 2023, subject to conditions, including provisions allowing the Board to reevaluate the hours of operation and truck trip limits.The Business and Consumer Docket affirmed the Planning Board’s decision. Newfield Sand appealed, arguing that the Planning Board lacked the authority to retain jurisdiction and modify permit conditions post-approval. The Town contended that the Board’s authority to impose such conditions was implied.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and concluded that the ordinance did not explicitly or implicitly authorize the Planning Board to modify or revoke a permit after issuance or retain jurisdiction over it. The Court found that the conditions allowing reevaluation of hours of operation and truck trips were outside the Board’s authority and did not clearly define compliance requirements. Consequently, the Court vacated the lower court’s judgment and remanded the matter to the Planning Board for further consideration of Newfield Sand’s application for a conditional use permit. View "Newfield Sand v. Town of Newfield" on Justia Law