Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court addressed an appeal from Citibank, N.A., challenging a District Court judgment in favor of the defendant, Ashley Moser, in a case related to the collection of credit card debt. The bank argued that the judgment violated its procedural due process rights due to insufficient notice about a hearing scheduled on April 12, 2023.The court had issued notices for both a 'first mediation' and a 'debt collection hearing' on the same day, at the same time, and in the same room. On the hearing day, Citibank's counsel attended without a representative from the bank, assuming that the case was scheduled for mediation and not a final hearing. The court proceeded with the hearing and entered a judgment in favor of Moser, as Citibank failed to satisfy its burden of proof.Citibank appealed, claiming the notices were ambiguous and violated its right to procedural due process. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Citibank, noting that the competing notices created an impossibility of both a mediation and a hearing taking place simultaneously. It ruled that the ambiguity in the notices and the court's subsequent judgment denied Citibank the required notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Citibank, N.A. v. Moser" on Justia Law

Two individuals, Ronald and Karen White, bought a used car from Real Deal Auto Sales & Service Center, LLC. After experiencing issues with the car, the Whites asked Real Deal to either replace the car's catalytic converters or give them a refund, which Real Deal refused. Subsequently, the Whites repaired the car themselves and sued Real Deal in a small claims action. The District Court ordered Real Deal to pay the Whites $6,000 for the repairs, plus costs. Real Deal appealed this decision to the Superior Court, which reversed the District Court's decision. The Whites appealed this reversal to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court ruled in favor of the Whites, agreeing that the Superior Court erred in reversing the original judgement. The case was therefore remanded for reinstatement of the small claims judgement in favor of the Whites.This decision was based on a Maine law which states that a dealer warrants that a vehicle has been inspected according to rules laid down by the state. Evidence presented by the Whites suggested that parts of the car's exhaust system were inadequate, which could have led the District Court to infer that the car did not meet state inspection standards at the time of sale. As such, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the evidence could support a determination that Real Deal breached the warranty of inspectability, thereby violating the Unfair Trade Practices Act. The Court remanded the matter to the Superior Court to enter a judgment affirming the District Court’s small claims judgement in favor of the Whites. View "White v. Real Deal Auto Sales & Service Center, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, Michael Bordick and Monica Bordick defaulted on a loan from Franklin Savings Bank, which was secured with a hunting cabin they owned on property they leased. The Bank filed a complaint for recovery of the cabin, and the Business and Consumer Docket ruled in favor of the Bank. The Bordicks appealed, arguing that the Bank did not make disclosures required by the Federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). The Bank argued that the credit transaction was not subject to TILA.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that a credit transaction secured by real property in the form of a lease is not exempt from TILA under 15 U.S.C.A. § 1603(3). However, the court also found that the lower court applied an incorrect test to determine whether the loan was for commercial purposes and therefore exempt under § 1603(1). The court vacated the judgment in favor of the Bank and remanded the case for the lower court to determine the nature of the loan, looking at the totality of the circumstances.The court also clarified that although the leased land where the cabin was located was not the Bordicks' principal dwelling, the credit transaction is not exempt from TILA under § 1603(3) because it was secured with real property. View "Franklin Savings Bank v. Bordick" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Barni A., appealed against an order from the District Court in Lewiston, Maine, terminating her parental rights to her older child. The child was born prematurely with a genetic abnormality that led to several medical issues, including tumors on his brain, leading to seizures and affecting his executive functioning, vision, and visual processing. The child qualified for 24/7 private nursing care under Maine's Medicaid program, MaineCare, but never received it. Barni A. argued that the State of Maine's failure to provide the child with the required care resulted in the trial court erroneously finding her unfit because she could not address her child's complicated medical needs.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Barni A., stating that the trial court's findings did not address important issues that needed to be answered before determining whether the record supports a finding by clear and convincing evidence that she is unfit. The court noted that the child's right to full-time private nursing care under federal and state law had not been provided by the Department of Health and Human Services, and this failure affected the mother's ability to care for the child. The court further explained that while the mother had made significant progress in dealing with her personal challenges, her visitation time with the child was substantially limited, and she was never afforded the assistance necessary to care for her child.The court therefore vacated the judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court, instructing it to consider whether the mother has an intellectual disability, whether the mother is or would be unfit regardless of the Department's failure to meet its MaineCare obligation regarding skilled nursing care, and whether there is an alternative to termination of the mother's parental rights that meets the best interest of the child. View "In re Child of Barni A." on Justia Law

In this case, Jacob R. Labbe Sr. was convicted by the trial court on one count of domestic violence stalking and two counts of violation of a protective order. Labbe appealed arguing that the stalking statute was unconstitutionally vague, the evidence was insufficient to convict him of domestic violence stalking, the court erred in denying his request to dismiss the charges as de minimis, and the court made several erroneous evidentiary rulings.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction. It held that the stalking statute was not unconstitutionally vague. The court found that the statute provided a clear definition of "course of conduct" and enough evidence supported a conviction for domestic violence stalking. It further held that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Labbe's request to dismiss the charges as de minimis. The court also found no error in the trial court's evidentiary rulings. The court concluded that the First Amendment did not require the State to prove reckless disregard on the part of Labbe for the effect of his statements on the victim, as the charge was not based on the content of Labbe's communications but rather on his persistent unwelcome contact with the victim. Therefore, the court found no error in the trial court's instructions to the jury. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Labbe" on Justia Law

In this case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed a dispute between Heather Keep and Christopher Indorf regarding the division of real estate they owned jointly. Keep and Indorf were unmarried domestic partners who had one child together. They purchased a house in Saco together, with Indorf contributing the down payment and both parties being liable for the mortgage. When their relationship ended, Keep moved out and Indorf assumed sole responsibility for the house. Keep filed a complaint for equitable partition in 2019. During the litigation process, the parties reached a partial settlement agreement, which was placed on the record during a judicial settlement conference. The agreement stated that for the valuation and division of any expenses associated with the home, they would use the date of May 1st, when Indorf had fully assumed all responsibility for the residence.The District Court (Biddeford, Tice, J.) eventually entered a partition judgment, setting aside the partial settlement agreement and dividing the real estate. Indorf appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion by setting aside the settlement agreement.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Indorf. It found that the parties had entered into an enforceable agreement, which the lower court could not simply disregard because it appeared unfair in light of subsequent events. The supreme court held that the agreement was ambiguous and remanded the case back to the District Court to determine the meaning of the agreement and to divide the property accordingly. The supreme court also dismissed Keep's cross-appeal as untimely. View "Keep v. Indorf" on Justia Law

In this case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed a decision by the District Court granting Camille J. Moulton's motion for summary judgment against J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. Moulton's property in Buckfield was subject to a mortgage held by J.P. Morgan. When Moulton stopped making payments on her loan, J.P. Morgan sent her a notice of default and right to cure. However, the notice overstated the amount required to cure the default due to an amount held in suspense by the bank, and was thus deemed deficient by the court.The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the District Court's decision that the notice was deficient and affirmed that portion of the judgment. However, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the District Court's judgment that required J.P. Morgan to discharge the mortgage, as there was no basis for the lower court to declare the effect of its judgment without a specific claim for declaratory relief. The court did not disturb the lower court's award of reasonable attorney fees to Moulton for defending against the foreclosure claim. The holding of this case is that a notice of default and right to cure is deficient if it does not clearly inform the borrower of the amount required to cure the default. If a lender has not complied with the prerequisites to acceleration, a court cannot conclude that initiation of a foreclosure action nevertheless accelerates the note balance. When a court enters summary judgment against a lender or dismisses the lender’s foreclosure claim due to a deficient notice, it does not preclude the lender from bringing a future foreclosure claim based on a future default, nor does it discharge the entire mortgage or effect a transfer of title. View "J.P. Morgan Acquisition Corp. v. Moulton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine upheld the conviction of Ralph A. Tripp Jr., who was found guilty of several drug-trafficking offenses, possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, and criminal forfeiture of property. Tripp appealed on the grounds that he should be immune from prosecution for his drug-related offenses, that there were errors in the State's conduct during its opening statement and closing argument, and that the jury was not provided with clear instructions. The court ruled that Maine’s immunity statutes did not apply in this case, that any prosecutorial error did not affect Tripp’s substantial rights, and that the trial court sufficiently corrected any potential confusion stemming from its initial jury instructions. The court therefore affirmed the judgment. The case involved Tripp and his wife, Amanda Tripp, who resided in a rooming house in Bangor. After the Tripps moved in, residents noticed an increase in visitors, found hypodermic needles outside the building, and frequently observed the Tripps letting visitors into the building. On one occasion, Tripp called 9-1-1 to report a person unconscious in one of the shared bathrooms of the rooming house. The person was later pronounced dead, and the cause of death was determined to be acute intoxication from multiple drugs. When the police executed a search warrant for Tripp’s room, they seized a handgun, various drugs, drug paraphernalia, and cash. Tripp was subsequently charged with several offenses. View "State v. Tripp" on Justia Law

In this case before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, the Office of the Public Advocate (OPA) contested an order by the Public Utilities Commission (Commission) that extended the waiver of the standard depreciation rate for the Maine Water Company - Millinocket Division (MWC). The OPA raised three claims: (1) the Commission erred in applying Chapter 110 of its rules to waive the depreciation rate set in Chapter 68, which according to the OPA already contained a waiver provision; (2) the Commission abused its discretion and set unjust and unreasonable rates by approving an arbitrarily low depreciation expense; and (3) the Commission relied on information that was not included in the evidentiary record.The court disagreed with all three claims raised by the OPA. Regarding the first claim, the court stated that Chapter 68 did not contain a waiver provision and that the Commission rightly applied the general waiver provision contained in Chapter 110. Concerning the second claim, the court found that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it extended the waiver in anticipation of a gradual return to full depreciation expenses. The court determined that the Commission's decision aligned with the statutory rate-setting goal and prevented rate shock. Lastly, the court determined that the OPA waived its third claim by not raising the issue about the lack of an evidentiary record earlier in the proceedings. As such, the court affirmed the Commission's order. View "Office of the Public Advocte v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves Hans Utsch and Julia H. Merck's appeal against a denial of their petition for judicial review of an email from the mining coordinator of the Department of Environmental Protection. The case originates from Harold MacQuinn, Inc.'s intent to restart quarry operations in Hall Quarry, Mount Desert. Under Maine law, quarry operations must comply with performance standards, and those intending to operate a quarry must file a “notice of intent to comply” (NOITC) with these performance standards. The email that Utsch and Merck challenge is about whether MacQuinn is required to file a NOITC.From 2012 to 2015, the mining coordinator asserted that MacQuinn did not need to file a NOITC, as the quarry operated before 1970 and was thus grandfathered into the performance standards for quarries. In 2017, the Legislature passed an act that added temporal language to the performance standards for quarries, limiting the one-acre threshold to areas excavated since January 1, 1970. MacQuinn modified its excavation plan so that the total area excavated would not exceed one acre, thus not requiring a NOITC according to the mining coordinator.Utsch and Merck, who live near the quarry, filed a petition for review of the mining coordinator’s email, claiming that the Department violated statutory provisions by determining that MacQuinn does not have to file a NOITC before operating the quarry. The Superior Court denied their petition, on the basis that the email was a final agency action and Utsch and Merck had standing to appeal it.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Superior Court’s judgment and remanded for dismissal of the petition. The court held that the mining coordinator’s email was not a final agency action, as it did not affect anyone’s “legal rights, duties or privileges” under the Maine Administrative Procedure Act. The court further held that Utsch and Merck's petition was not ripe for consideration as a declaratory judgment action because it fails both prongs required for ripeness, as their allegations were too uncertain and speculative. View "Utsch v. Department of Environmental Protection" on Justia Law