Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of Quang Pham on Atlantic Home Solutions, Inc.'s claim for recovery of personal property pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 7071, holding that there was no error.Atlantic sought a judgment and writ of possession authorizing it to take possession of a modular home, the appliances, and the heating unit by removing them from Pham's property. The trial court issued judgment in favor of Pham, concluding that the modular home and other items no longer constituted personal property because they had become part of Pham's real estate. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not misapply the law, and its findings were supported by the record evidence. View "Atlantic Home Solutions, Inc. v. Pham" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part the judgment entered in the Business and Consumer Docket (BCD) awarding attorney fees and expenses to Forney & Weygandt, Inc. (F&W) but vacated a portion of the judgment awarding F&W attorney fees and expenses related to subcontractor claims, holding that remand was required.Lewiston DMEP IX, LLC, et al. (collectively, GBT), a group of limited purpose entities and a commercial real estate developer, appealed the attorney fees and expenses award to F&W, a commercial general contractor, pursuant to Maine's prompt payment statute, Me. Rev. Stat. 10, 1111-1120. Specifically, GBT contended that the BCD erred in awarding attorney fees and expenses that were not incurred in direct pursuit of F&W's prompt payment claims, including those related to F&W's contract claims, GBT's counterclaims and affirmative defenses, and subcontractor claims against F&W. The Supreme Judicial Court largely affirmed the judgment but vacated the award of attorney fees and expenses related to the subcontractor claims, holding that the court abused its discretion when it did not articulate a basis for an award of fees that would be proper under the prompt payment statute and this Court's interpretative case law. View "Fortney & Weygandt, Inc. v. Lewiston DMEP IX, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's order concluding that because Jackson Lumber & Millwork Co. was both the mortgagee and the purchaser at the public sale of certain foreclosed property the fair market value of that property as established by an independent appraisal - rather than the value established by the highest bid at the public sale - was appropriate to determine the amount of any deficiency, holding that the superior court did not err.In ruling on Jackson Lumber's motion for approval of attachment and trustee process, the superior court concluded that Jackson Lumber was the "purchaser at the public sale" and that there was no recoverable deficiency given that the appraised value of the property exceeded the amount owed at the time of the foreclosure. At issue was whether Jackson Lumber was the "purchaser at the public sale" even though it did not ultimately acquire the property because it later assigned away its rights and never received the deed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not misinterpret the law or otherwise err or abuse its discretion in denying the motion for approval of attachment and trustee process as to the property. View "Jackson Lumber & Millwork Co. v. Rockwell Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court granting the motion of Defendant, Plaintiff's former employer, to dismiss Plaintiff's disability discrimination and failure to accommodate claims as time-barred under the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA), Me. Rev. Stat. 5, 4551-4634, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff brought this complaint alleging two counts under the Americans with Disabilities Act and two counts under the MHRA. A federal district court dismissed the first two counts and remanded the MHRA counts to the superior court. On remand, the superior court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss the remaining counts. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the action was not commenced within two years after the act of unlawful discrimination complained of, and therefore, the superior court properly determined that Plaintiff's disability discrimination claim was not commenced within he two-year statute of limitations under the MHRA. View "Berounsky v. Oceanside Rubbish, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the probate court denying Mother's petition to modify or terminate an order of the superior court that transferred custody and guardianship of her child to the child's paternal grandmother and step-grandfather (together, Grandparents), holding that the probate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.A Connecticut superior court granted the motion filed by the Connecticut Department of Children and Families to transfer custody and guardianship of the child to Grandparents, who lived in New Hampshire. After Mother, the child, and Grandparents had all moved to Maine, Mother filed a petition in the Hancock County Probate Court seeking to register and modify or terminate the Connecticut order. The probate court denied Mother's petition. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order below, holding that the probate court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider or adjudicate Mother's petition to modify a guardianship established in Connecticut's equivalent of a child protection matter. View "In re Guardianship by Stacey M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the summary judgment entered in the superior court in favor of Defendant and dismissing Plaintiff's complaint alleging unlawful discrimination, retaliation, and discharge, holding that there was no error.In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant, her former employer, violated the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, Me. Rev. Stat. 26 831-840; the Maine Human Rights Act, Me. Rev. Stat. 5, 4551-4634; and Me. Rev. Stat. 26 570. The court granted Defendant summary judgment on all counts. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) summary judgment in favor of Defendant was appropriate; and (2) the court did not err in denying Plaintiff's motion for relief pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) because Defendant's electronic service did not violate Plaintiff's right to due process. View "Handlin v. Broadreach Public Relations, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the summary judgment entered in the business and consumer court in favor of UIG, Inc. on Yankee Pride Transportation and Logistics, Inc.'s claims of negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty, holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to causation.On appeal, Yankee Pride argued that it had an implied contract with UIG based on the parties' relationship and that UIG breached that contract by failing to make timely efforts to renew Yankee Pride's policy. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding that Yankee Pride's failure to offer competent evidence of causation precluded a prima facie showing on any of its claims, whether they sounded in contract, tort, or breach of fiduciary duty. View "Yankee Pride Transportation & Logistics, Inc. v. UIG, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the summary judgment of the superior court concluding that the complaint brought by the Estate of Marion Sprague against Bankers Life and Casualty Company for breach of a home health insurance contract was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, holding that the facts established that the limitations period had not expired before the Estate filed suit.The Estate brought this complaint alleging breach of contract, detrimental reliance, impossibility of performance, quantum merit, and violation of Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 24-A, 2155. Bankers Life filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Estate's action was time-barred under Maine's six-year statute of limitations for civil actions. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the summary judgment, holding that the Estate timely filed its complaint within the six-year limitations period. View "Estate of Sprague v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the appellate division of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming the decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ) granting Plaintiff's petition for award of compensation, holding that an employee is not required to give notice of his occupational disease claim to his former employer's insurer when the employer no longer exists.Nearly twenty years after retiring from his employment Plaintiff underwent surgery for lung cancer and was later diagnosed with asbestosis. Plaintiff filed five petitions for award of compensation, each alleging a different date of injury and naming and different employer and insurer pairing. The ALJ (1) found that Plaintiff's last injurious exposure to asbestos occurred when he was working for Auburn Sheet Metal, which was insured by Maine Employers' Mutual Insurance Company (MEMIC) but no longer existed, and (2) granted Plaintiff's petition for an award of compensation. The appellate division concluded that Plaintiff was not required to provide notice to MEMIC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate division did not err in concluding that the workers' compensation statute does not impose on an injured employee whose employer no longer exists the duty to give notice to the insurer. View "Desgrosseilliers v. Auburn Sheet Metal" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgments entered by the district court establishing Dawn and James Ostrander as de facto parents of two biological children of Mark Martin and Marylou MacMahan, allocating parental rights and responsibilities and child support among the parties, and amending a divorce judgment between Martin and MacMahan, holding that the judgment amending the divorce judgment was in error.In an agreed-upon divorce judgment, the family court awarded shared parental rights of the twins of MacMahan and Martin to both parties. Later, the Ostranders, with whom the children were living, filed a complaint seeking a determination of de facto parentage, parental rights and responsibilities, and child support. The court concluded that the Ostranders were the de facto parents of the children, decided that parental rights would be shared among the Ostranders, Martin, and MacMahan, and amended some of the divorce judgment's provisions. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment amending the divorce judgment and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err in establishing de facto parentage, parental rights and responsibilities, and child support; and (2) the judgment amending the divorce judgment was inconsistent with the judgment establishing parental rights and responsibilities. View "Martin v. MacMahan" on Justia Law