Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Richard W. Kelley was convicted of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs after a stop and search of a friend's vehicle in which he was a passenger. Law enforcement conducted the search as part of an investigation into the vehicle's owner for drug trafficking, using a search warrant and two tracking warrants to monitor the vehicle's location. Kelley moved to suppress the evidence obtained through the warrants, arguing that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.The trial court (Penobscot County, A. Murray, J.) denied Kelley's motion to suppress on the grounds that he lacked standing to challenge the search. Kelley argued that the court should not have addressed his standing because the State had stipulated that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. However, the court concluded that standing is a threshold issue that must be addressed regardless of the State's stipulation. Kelley was subsequently convicted based on his conditional guilty plea.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the State's stipulation regarding Kelley's standing was not binding on the court. The court further held that Kelley lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, as he did not have a property or possessory interest in it, nor did he have an interest in the property seized. Therefore, Kelley did not have standing to challenge the search warrants. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Taylor M. appealed a judgment from the District Court terminating her parental rights to her child, arguing that her due process rights were violated and that the court failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The child, born prematurely with various medical conditions, required extensive care. Taylor M., a registered member of the Mi’kmaq Nation, was largely absent during the child’s initial hospitalization. The Department of Health and Human Services filed for a child protection order, which was granted, and the child was placed with resource parents.The District Court held a jeopardy hearing in January 2023, finding clear and convincing evidence of jeopardy due to Taylor M.’s inability to care for the child. The court scheduled several hearings, but delays occurred, and the child’s resource parents moved out of state with the Department and tribe’s agreement. In October 2023, the Department filed a petition to terminate Taylor M.’s parental rights. At the consolidated hearing in January 2024, the court heard testimony from various parties, including the ICWA director for the Mi’kmaq Nation.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the District Court complied with ICWA requirements. The court determined that the Department made active efforts to reunify the family and that Taylor M. did not take significant steps to address the jeopardy. The court also found beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody by Taylor M. would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. The court affirmed the termination of Taylor M.’s parental rights, concluding that the child’s placement with the resource parents was appropriate and in the child’s best interest. View "In re Child of Taylor M." on Justia Law

Robert E. Dupuis and twelve other plaintiffs filed lawsuits against the Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, seeking damages for sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by the Bishop’s clergy when the plaintiffs were minor children. Their claims were previously barred by the statute of limitations. The Bishop moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that 14 M.R.S. § 752-C(3) (2022), which purports to revive the plaintiffs’ claims, deprives the Bishop of a constitutionally protected vested right.The Business and Consumer Docket (McKeon, J.) denied the Bishop’s motions but reported its orders to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court under Maine Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c). The court accepted the report to determine whether the retroactive application of section 752-C(3) is constitutional.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that the retroactive application of section 752-C(3) contravenes centuries of precedent and multiple provisions of the Maine Declaration of Rights, as well as the Constitution’s provisions regarding separation of powers. The court concluded that once a statute of limitations has expired for a claim, a right to be free of that claim has vested, and the claim cannot be revived. Therefore, section 752-C(3) is unconstitutional as applied to expired claims. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Dupuis v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland" on Justia Law

A District Court in Caribou, Maine, issued a judgment in February 2024 regarding the parental rights and responsibilities of a child born to Andrew M. Landeen and Ashley Burch, who were former romantic partners but never married. The court granted primary physical residence to Burch and visitation rights to Landeen. Additionally, the court changed the child's last name to "Landeen" without providing specific findings or comments on the decision. Burch appealed the name change, and Landeen cross-appealed the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities.The District Court's judgment was based on the best interest of the child, considering factors such as the parents' ability to cooperate and the child's emotional and physical safety. The court found that Landeen's persistent anger towards Burch and his inability to manage frustration appropriately were detrimental to the child's best interest. Consequently, the court allocated primary parental rights to Burch while allowing Landeen visitation rights and the right to be informed of major decisions concerning the child.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the District Court's allocation of parental rights and responsibilities was supported by the record and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. However, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the judgment changing the child's last name. The court held that the father’s desire to change the child's surname, based solely on tradition and without supporting evidence, did not meet the statutory requirement of showing "good cause" or that the change was in the child's best interest. The court emphasized that both parents have equal rights in naming their child and that any name change must be justified by the child's best interest. View "Landeen v. Burch" on Justia Law

Billy L. Beaulieu was charged with criminal OUI (Class C) under Maine law. He filed a motion to dismiss the charges, claiming immunity under Maine’s Good Samaritan statute, which provides immunity from prosecution if a call for assistance for a suspected drug-related overdose is made at the location of a medical emergency. Beaulieu argued that the statute’s requirements were met because a driver who saw his car beside an interstate highway exit asked the police to check on the vehicle, suspecting a medical event.The Cumberland County trial court denied Beaulieu’s motion to dismiss. The court found that the witness was concerned about a medical event and reported it to the police, who then checked on Beaulieu. However, the court concluded that the situation did not meet the statutory requirements for immunity because the call was not for a suspected drug-related overdose, and there was no medical emergency.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that the Good Samaritan statute’s plain language requires the call for assistance to be specifically for a suspected drug-related overdose and that the location must be a medical emergency. The court found that the witness’s concern about a general medical event did not satisfy the statute’s requirements. Additionally, there was no evidence of a medical emergency at the scene. Therefore, Beaulieu was not entitled to immunity under the Good Samaritan statute, and the denial of his motion to dismiss was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Beaulieu" on Justia Law

Dennis W. Lowery was convicted of gross sexual assault after a jury trial in Cumberland County. The incident occurred on December 19, 2021, when Lowery entered the victim's room at a Portland inn without her knowledge or permission and sexually assaulted her while she was asleep. The victim identified Lowery to the police, who found him nearby. DNA evidence linked Lowery to the crime.The trial court denied Lowery's motions to dismiss and for a new trial, which were based on alleged discovery violations by the State. Lowery argued that the State failed to disclose information about certain witnesses and evidence handlers in a timely manner. The court allowed the testimony of these witnesses, reasoning that Lowery was aware of their roles and had the opportunity to cross-examine them. The court also denied Lowery's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the gross sexual assault charge but granted it on a burglary charge due to a defect in the indictment.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decisions. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in handling the alleged discovery violations, as Lowery was not prejudiced to the extent that it deprived him of a fair trial. The court also found no obvious error in the admission of evidence regarding Lowery's pre-arrest silence, as Lowery did not invoke his right to remain silent before being questioned by the police. The court concluded that the trial court's actions were appropriate and did not violate Lowery's due process rights. View "State of Maine v. Lowery" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a 1944 deed that placed a 330-acre parcel of land, known as Camp Bomazeen, in a charitable trust for use by the Boy Scouts of America for camping. Pine Tree Council, Inc., Boy Scouts of America (Pine Tree) appealed a summary judgment from the Superior Court (Kennebec County) against it on the Attorney General’s complaint for breach of trust and on Pine Tree’s counterclaims for declaratory judgment regarding its property rights in the land. Intervenors Bruce F. Rueger and Scott F. Adams, representing the Bomazeen Old Timers, cross-appealed, arguing the court erred in entering summary judgment against them on their claims against Pine Tree for breach of fiduciary duties and their request for the court to apply the cy pres doctrine.The Superior Court found in favor of the Attorney General, concluding that Pine Tree had only legal title to the property and not equitable title. The court determined that Pine Tree could sell Camp Bomazeen but must use the proceeds to support camping activities for Boy Scouts in central Maine, consistent with the trust’s purposes. The court also ruled against Pine Tree on its counterclaims and against the Old Timers on their claims.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. It held that Pine Tree succeeded only to legal title of the property and not to equitable title, meaning the trust did not terminate. The court also held that the proceeds from any sale of Camp Bomazeen must be used for the trust’s original purposes. The court found no basis for applying the cy pres doctrine, as the trust’s purposes could still be achieved. The judgment against Pine Tree and the Old Timers was affirmed. View "Attorney General v. Pine Tree Council, Inc., Boy Scouts of America" on Justia Law

Richard W. Kelley was convicted of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs after a stop and search of a friend's vehicle in which he was a passenger. Law enforcement conducted the search as part of an investigation into the vehicle's owner for drug trafficking, using a search warrant and two tracking warrants to monitor the vehicle's location. Kelley moved to suppress the evidence obtained through the warrants, arguing that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.The trial court (Penobscot County, A. Murray, J.) denied Kelley's motion to suppress on the grounds that he lacked standing to challenge the search. Kelley argued that the court should not have reached the question of his standing because the State had stipulated that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. However, the court concluded that standing is a threshold issue that must be addressed, and Kelley did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the State's stipulation regarding Kelley's standing was not binding on the court and that Kelley lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. The court noted that Kelley did not own the vehicle, had never driven it, and had only stored personal items in it for a short period. Therefore, Kelley did not have standing to challenge the search warrants, and the judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Ramel L. Sheppard was convicted of domestic violence aggravated assault after a jury trial in which the victim did not testify. The conviction was based in part on the victim's hearsay statement to a police officer identifying Sheppard as her attacker. Sheppard appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay statement as an excited utterance and that its admission violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution.The trial court (Androscoggin County) admitted the victim's statement under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, finding that the statement was made spontaneously and while the victim was still under the stress of the assault. The court also determined that the statement was nontestimonial, as it was made in the context of an ongoing emergency and not for the primary purpose of creating evidence for prosecution. The jury found Sheppard guilty on two counts, but the court later merged one count into the other and sentenced Sheppard to seven years' imprisonment, with all but forty months suspended, and three years of probation.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the victim's statement as an excited utterance, as the statement was made spontaneously and under the stress of the assault. The court also held that the statement was nontestimonial, as it was made in the context of an ongoing emergency and not for the primary purpose of creating evidence for prosecution. Therefore, the admission of the statement did not violate Sheppard's rights under the Confrontation Clause. View "State of Maine v. Sheppard" on Justia Law

Between 2007 and 2009, Susan McCarthy’s minor child, M, was in the care of McCarthy’s friend, Glynis McCormack, at McCormack’s home. During this time, McCormack’s minor nephew, Z, who also lived there, physically, sexually, and emotionally abused M, resulting in ongoing mental health issues for M. McCormack was insured under a homeowner’s policy issued by Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company. McCarthy obtained a consent judgment against McCormack, agreeing to recover a limited amount directly from McCormack and seek the remainder from Metropolitan as McCormack’s insurer.The Superior Court (York County) declared that Metropolitan had no duty to indemnify McCormack for the consent judgment. McCarthy appealed this declaratory judgment. Previously, Metropolitan had filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the United States District Court, asserting no duty to defend or indemnify McCormack due to policy exclusions. The District Court declared Metropolitan had a duty to defend McCormack but could not litigate its duty to indemnify until McCormack’s liability was determined. The First Circuit affirmed this decision. Subsequently, McCarthy and McCormack settled, and the Superior Court entered a consent judgment.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The court held that the “intentional loss” and “abuse” exclusions in McCormack’s policy barred coverage for McCarthy’s claims. The court concluded that both McCormack and Z fell within the policy definition of “you,” and thus, Z’s intentional acts of abuse, which were excluded from coverage, also excluded McCormack from coverage. Consequently, Metropolitan had no duty to indemnify McCormack for the consent judgment. View "Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. McCarthy" on Justia Law