Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed this appeal from an order of the superior court denying Down East Orthopedic Associates, P.A.'s motion to dismiss Carol Cutting's complaint for medical malpractice, holding that Down East had not established that this was the rare case that warranted the application of the judicial economy exception to the final judgment rule.Cutting filed a federal malpractice action against Down East asserting counts for failure to obtain informed consent and medical malpractice. The federal court dismissed the federal malpractice case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Cutting then filed a complaint in the state superior court asserting the same causes of action as those in her federal malpractice case. Down East filed a motion to dismiss on claim preclusion grounds. The superior court denied the motion, and Down East appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that this appeal does not come within the judicial economy exception to the final judgment rule. View "Cutting v. Down East Orthopedic Associates, P.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court sentencing Defendant to fifteen years of imprisonment after he was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated trafficking in scheduled drugs and one count of criminal forfeiture, holding that the sentencing court did not improperly engage in "double counting."On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred when it considered the commercial motive of his offenses both when it set the basic sentence and when it set the maximum sentence. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly considered different aspects of the commercial nature of the offense at each step of the court's analysis. View "State v. Plummer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the opinion of the Workers' Compensation Board Appellate Division agreeing with the conclusion of the administrative law judge (ALJ) that Darla Potter, an aquaculture worker, was not a "seaman" within the meaning of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. 30104, holding that the Appellate Division did not err.The Appellate Division affirmed the decree of the ALJ granting Potter's petitions for award of compensation for injuries sustained in the course of her employment with Cooke Aquaculture USA, Inc. At issue on appeal was whether Potter's claims fell within the jurisdiction of federal admiralty law or state workers' compensation law. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Potter was not a seaman within the purview of the Jones Act. View "Potter v. Great Falls Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing with prejudice a complaint for protection from abuse that Plaintiff brought on behalf of her three minor children against the children's father (Father), holding that due process did not require that the court dismiss this matter with prejudice.After Plaintiff filed her complaint for protection from abuse on behalf of her children, Father was arrested. Father's bail conditions prohibited contact between Father and the children. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the complaint without prejudice given that Father's bail conditions protected the children. The court denied Plaintiff's motion and dismissed the case with prejudice, concluding that it did not have the discretion to grant Plaintiff's motion. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the court erred as a matter of law when it determined that due process and Me. Rev. Stat. 4006(1) required it to either hold the hearing as scheduled or dismiss the complaint with prejudice and that, pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), the court had the authority and discretion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint without prejudice. View "Doe v. Hills-Pettitt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of domestic violence assault, holding that Defendant was not prejudiced.On appeal, Defendant argued (1) the trial court erred by allowing testimony from Defendant's fifteen-year-old daughter concerning Defendant's parenting practices, and (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by commenting on admissible evidence during its cross-examination of her. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) because, in her opening statement, Defendant indicated her pursuit of the parental discipline justification found at Me. Rev. Stat. 17-A, 106(1), the court did not err in admitting evidence of Defendant's parenting; and (2) the State committed prosecutorial conduct by eliciting and commenting on evidence that other children had been removed from Defendant's home, but the error was not so prejudicial that it affected the outcome of the proceeding. View "State v. Pratt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of one count of intentional, knowing, or depraved indifference murder, one count of depraved indifference murder, and one count of arson and sentence of two life terms for the murders, holding that there was no error in Defendant's sentence.The trial court set Defendant's basic sentence for both murders at life imprisonment based on the application of two of the aggravating circumstances named in State v. Shortsleeves, 580 A.2d 145 (Me. 1990) - premeditation-in-fact and extreme cruelty. On appeal, Defendant challenged both aggravating circumstances. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err by applying premeditation-in-fact and extreme cruelty as aggravating circumstances to justify imposition of a basic sentence of life imprisonment for both counts of murder; and (2) the trial court precisely complied with the legal principles that apply to setting the basic sentence. View "State v. De St. Croix" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the divorce judgment entered by the district court, holding that district court did not err in its property distribution between the parties.On appeal, Dorothy Lovell argued (1) the district court erred when it determined that Paul Lovell was not judicially estopped from arguing that a retirement account was marital property, despite a contrary provision in a previous divorce judgment; (2) she received insufficient notice of the district court's intention to reevaluation the distribution of the entire marital estate; and (3) the district court committed obvious error when it determined that part of the retirement account was marital property. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the doctrine of judicial estoppel did not apply here; (2) Dorothy's due process argument was waived; and (3) the district court did not err in its property distribution. View "Lovell v. Lovell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the business and consumer docket's entry of final judgment reaffirming a partial summary judgment on the complaint filed by Michael Zelman and a counterclaim filed by Andrew and Zelman Family Business Holdings, LLC (ZFBH), holding that the business and consumer court had subject matter jurisdiction.Michael brought this action both individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Estelle Betty Zelman asking the superior court to dissolve and liquidate ZFBH. Andrew and ZFBH filed an answer and counterclaim. The court entered a final judgment concluding that Andrew was not a manager of ZFBH and that the sole remaining manager of ZFBH had died and declining to dissolve ZFBH. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the business and consumer court had subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction; and (2) the court correctly concluded that William did not have the authority to appoint Andrew as a manager of ZFBH. View "Zelman v. Zelman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the Workers' Compensation Board Appellate Division vacating the judgment of the administrative law judge (ALJ) denying Lorraine Somers's petition to have her benefits reinstated, holding that the Appellate Division did not err.The Board entered a decree permitting S.D. Warrant Company and its insurer (collectively, S.D. Warren) to discontinue paying Somers partial incapacity benefits when those payments had reached the 520-week statutory limit. Somers filed a petition to have her benefits reinstated, arguing that S.D. Warren failed to comply with Me. W.C.B. Rule, ch. 2, 5(1) (the former Rule) by not providing her with notice that she could be eligible for an extension of weekly benefits. An ALJ denied the petition. The Appellate Division vacated that decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that S.D. Warren was required to give Somers notice pursuant to the former Rule before terminating her benefits. View "Somers v. S.D. Warren Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the interlocutory order of the superior court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds a superseding indictment against him, holding that neither the United States Double Jeopardy Clause nor its counterpart in the Maine Constitution barred the State from retrying Defendant on the superseding indictment.On appeal, Defendant argued that the superior court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the dismissal of the original indictment against him after the jury was empaneled and sworn barred the State from charging him twice with the same offense. The Supreme Judicial Court clarified the implications of a defective indictment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions and affirmed, holding (1) jeopardy attached in Defendant's trial; but (2) the trial court's dismissal of the indictment was not the equivalent of an acquittal and did not bar retrial. View "State v. Shirey" on Justia Law