Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves a property dispute in the Holiday Beach neighborhood of Owls Head, Maine, between John M. Carter and Christine C. Carter (the Carters) and their neighbors, Michael A. Voncannon and N. Kermit Voncannon (the Voncannons), and Zachary Rogers and Kathryn Rogers as Trustees of the Nancy C. Rogers Irrevocable Trust (the Rogerses). The dispute centers on the ownership and use of two "paper streets"—Austin Avenue and the Reserved Way—that transect their properties.The Business and Consumer Docket (Murphy, J.) held a bench trial and found that the Carters had superior title to Austin Avenue, while the Voncannons and Rogerses had acquired title to the Reserved Way through adverse possession. The court determined that the Carters' deed conveyed the Reserved Way to them, but the Voncannons and Rogerses had used the Reserved Way openly, notoriously, and exclusively for over twenty years, thus meeting the requirements for adverse possession. The court also found that the Reserved Way terminates at Holiday Beach Road and does not extend to the high-water mark of Owls Head Harbor.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The Court held that the Carters had full record title to Austin Avenue and that the Voncannons and Rogerses' activities on Austin Avenue constituted trespass. The Court also upheld the finding that the Reserved Way terminates at Holiday Beach Road, not the high-water mark. Additionally, the Court agreed that the Voncannons and Rogerses had acquired title to their respective halves of the Reserved Way through adverse possession, as their use of the land was actual, open, visible, notorious, hostile, under a claim of right, continuous, and exclusive for the statutory period. The Court found no clear error in the trial court's factual determinations and legal conclusions. View "Carter v. Voncannon" on Justia Law

Rebecca Adeyanju, a White woman, was employed by Foot and Ankle Associates of Maine, P.A. as a medical assistant and radiology technician since 2012. In 2018, she married a Black man from Nigeria. In August 2019, Adeyanju missed three consecutive workdays to assist her husband, who was being sought by ICE agents. She informed her employer of her absences via text messages. Upon returning to work, she was terminated for "job abandonment" due to her three-day absence.The Superior Court (Cumberland County) granted summary judgment in favor of Foot and Ankle Associates, concluding that Adeyanju failed to show sufficient evidence that her termination was motivated by discriminatory animus or that the stated reason for her termination was pretextual. Adeyanju appealed the decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the summary judgment record, viewed in the light most favorable to Adeyanju, revealed genuine issues of material fact. These included inconsistencies in the employer's enforcement of its attendance policy, differential treatment of employees with similar absences, and potential racial animus linked to the involvement of ICE. The court concluded that these issues warranted a trial to determine whether the termination was indeed motivated by discriminatory animus or if the employer's stated reason was pretextual.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the summary judgment and remanded the case for trial, allowing Adeyanju to present her claims of employment discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. View "Adeyanju v. Foot and Ankle Associates of Maine, P.A." on Justia Law

Gregory R. Flagg filed for divorce from Shauna K. Bartlett in 2012, resulting in a settlement agreement that included shared parental rights and responsibilities, with a child support order requiring Flagg to pay $81 weekly. In 2021, Bartlett moved to modify the child support order, and Flagg cross-moved to modify the divorce judgment and child support order, citing substantial changes in circumstances. The District Court initially granted Flagg's motion, determining that Bartlett did not provide substantially equal care and awarded primary residence to Flagg without child support. Bartlett then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment.The District Court later amended its judgment, granting Bartlett's motion to modify child support and denying Flagg's cross-motion. The court found that although Flagg provided more care, the level of care had not significantly changed since the original agreement. The court concluded that the care provided by both parents was substantially equal and modified Flagg's child support obligation to $185 weekly. Flagg appealed, arguing that the court erred in determining that the parties provided substantially equal care.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the District Court had abused its discretion by failing to properly assess whether the parties provided substantially equal care for the purpose of determining child support. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the amended judgment, the amended child support order, and the order denying Flagg's motions for findings of fact and conclusions of law. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the parties are providing substantially equal care and to make consistent findings of fact and conclusions of law. View "Flagg v. Bartlett" on Justia Law

In this case, Randall C. Belyea was the sole shareholder and president of Belyea Enterprises, Inc. (BEI), which had a contract with FedEx. Due to a misdemeanor charge, FedEx refused to renew the contract with Belyea, leading him to transfer his interest in BEI to his fiancée, Heather A. Campbell, under the understanding that she would be the owner in name only while he continued to run the business. However, in 2018, Campbell terminated Belyea's employment and restricted his access to BEI's bank accounts.The Superior Court (Aroostook County) initially granted Campbell’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on Belyea’s conversion claim and later entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of Campbell on Belyea’s breach of contract claim, despite a jury verdict in Belyea’s favor. The court found that there was insufficient evidence of an enforceable contract between Belyea and Campbell, as the terms were too vague and indefinite.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the terms of the alleged contract between Belyea and Campbell were not sufficiently definite to form an enforceable contract. The terms did not clearly define the roles and obligations of each party, the duration of the contract, or the details regarding a possible reconveyance of BEI to Belyea. Consequently, the court also upheld the judgment in favor of Campbell on the conversion claim, as Belyea did not have a legal interest in BEI in 2018. View "Belyea v. Campbell" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including William Clardy, Michelle Tucker, two state representatives, and a nonprofit corporation, filed a lawsuit against Maine's Senate President, Speaker of the House, and Governor. They sought to invalidate a special legislative session called by the Governor, arguing it was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs claimed the session was based on a "contrived" extraordinary occasion and that the legislative leaders ceded power to the executive branch. They sought declarations that the session and the legislation passed during it were void.The Kennebec County Superior Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court did not decide on the plaintiffs' standing but ruled that the Governor's determination of an extraordinary occasion to convene the Legislature was not subject to judicial review. Additionally, the court found that the legislative leaders were immune from suit for their actions. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the dismissal, but on different grounds. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit. The court found that the individual plaintiffs, as citizens and taxpayers, did not demonstrate a particularized injury distinct from the general public. The state representatives failed to show a concrete injury arising from the Governor's proclamation or the convening of the special session. Lastly, the nonprofit corporation lacked standing because its members did not have standing to sue individually. The court concluded that no plaintiff had suffered an injury sufficient to confer standing, thus affirming the lower court's dismissal of the case. View "Clardy v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Industrial Energy Consumer Group (IECG) appealed an order from the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) regarding the recovery of costs related to power supply obligations and state energy programs. The PUC decided that these costs should be recovered volumetrically from all ratepayer classes, except for one category, which should be recovered using a fixed customer charge. IECG argued that the order was preempted by the Federal Power Act and that the allocation and design violated cost-causation principles and state statutes.The Office of the Public Advocate contended that IECG’s appeal was untimely and should be dismissed. The PUC argued that the appeal was an improper collateral attack on a prior rate order. Both the Public Advocate and the PUC maintained that if the merits were considered, the order should be affirmed as rational and supported.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the appeal was timely and not barred by collateral estoppel. The court did not address the preemption argument, finding it unpreserved for appellate review. The court rejected IECG’s arguments on the merits, noting the deferential standard of review for the PUC’s expert judgment in ratemaking. The court found that the PUC’s decision to treat NEB costs separately from traditional T&D service costs was rational and supported by the record. The court also determined that the PUC’s allocation and rate design did not violate state statutes.The court affirmed the PUC’s order, holding that the PUC’s approach to NEB cost recovery was within its broad discretion and sufficiently justified. The court noted that the PUC might refine its approach in the future based on further data collection and party input. View "Industrial Energy Consumer Group v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Patrick Gordon, an attorney, was suspended from the rosters of the Maine Commission on Public Defense Services, making him ineligible to represent indigent criminal defendants. The suspension followed an investigation into Gordon’s billing practices and representation of a client. The Commission received information suggesting that Gordon had inaccurately billed for a jury trial that was actually a bench trial and that some billed work was performed by others in his firm. Additionally, there were discrepancies regarding Gordon’s client visits.The Superior Court (Kennebec County) affirmed the Commission’s decision. The investigation began after the Commission received information from a post-conviction review counsel. Gordon was asked to provide documents and clarify billing discrepancies but failed to fully comply. Despite multiple requests and extensions, Gordon did not provide the requested documents or satisfactory explanations. The Commission’s Interim Executive Director, Justin Andrus, ultimately suspended Gordon, a decision upheld by the Commission after an intra-agency appeal.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court found that the Commission’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The evidence showed that Gordon failed to comply with the Commission’s requests, which were within the Commission’s authority. The investigation and subsequent suspension were justified based on Gordon’s non-compliance with the Commission’s rules. The Court concluded that the Commission’s decision was supported by evidence and did not reflect any abuse of discretion or erroneous findings of fact. View "Gordon v. Maine Commission on Public Defense Services" on Justia Law

The case involves a divorce judgment from the District Court in Biddeford, where the court disposed of the marital property and awarded Cynthia (Pray) Wood McKenna $8,400 per month in general spousal support for life. Thomas Pray appealed, arguing that the court double-counted the value of trucks used in his pest-control business, failed to account for the value of the business attributable to his personal goodwill, engaged in improper "double dipping" by relying on his income from the business to determine both the value of the business and the amount of spousal support, failed to consider all relevant spousal support factors, and abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Wood McKenna.The District Court awarded Wood McKenna the marital residence, several IRAs, bank accounts, and personal property, while Pray received an IRA, credit union accounts, the pest-control business, and trucks. To equalize the property division, Pray was ordered to pay Wood McKenna $288,150. The court also awarded Wood McKenna spousal support based on several statutory factors, including the length of the marriage, disparity in earnings, age difference, and her health condition. Pray filed a motion for further findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the court denied without altering its findings.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the District Court erred in double-counting the trucks' value in the property allocation and in making insufficient findings to explain the spousal support award. The court vacated the property disposition and spousal support award and remanded for further consideration. The court dismissed Pray's appeal regarding attorney fees as not ripe for review. The court held that the lower court must reconsider its calculations and any effect on the division of marital property, and make specific findings regarding Pray's income and the income potential from the assets awarded to Wood McKenna. View "McKenna v. Pray" on Justia Law

The Connary heirs appealed a summary judgment favoring the Shea brothers regarding the reformation of the Shea Family Living Trust. The Trust, established by William and Patricia Shea, included a provision to distribute bank stock to the Connary heirs. However, the bank recalled and redeemed the stock, and the Trust received approximately $460,000. After Patricia's death, the successor trustee determined the stock was no longer part of the Trust and refused to distribute money in lieu of the stock to the Connary heirs.Initially, the Superior Court (Stewart, J.) ruled that the Trust's legacy of the bank stock was a specific devise that had adeemed, meaning the stock was no longer part of the Trust. The court dismissed Connary's reformation claim without specific litigation on that issue. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the interpretation of the Trust but remanded the case for further proceedings on the reformation claim.On remand, the Superior Court (O’Neil, J.) granted summary judgment to the Shea brothers, concluding that Connary had not provided admissible evidence to generate a genuine dispute of fact regarding the reformation claim. Connary argued that Patricia's statements to family members about her intent should be considered, but the court ruled this evidence inadmissible.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and concluded that even if Patricia's statements were admissible, Connary's reformation claim could not survive summary judgment. The court held that reformation is only available to conform to both settlors' intentions if affected by a mistake. There was no evidence of William's intent or mistake regarding the bank stock. Additionally, reformation cannot be used to address changes in circumstances that occurred after the Trust's execution. Therefore, the judgment was affirmed. View "Connary v. Shea" on Justia Law

Michael T. Smith was convicted of twelve counts of unlawful sexual contact after a jury trial. The charges stemmed from allegations that Smith sexually abused his stepdaughter between 2011 and 2014 and his daughter between 2011 and 2019. The Oxford County Sheriff’s Office received a report in September 2019, leading to separate interviews of the victims. Smith’s stepdaughter disclosed abuse, resulting in an initial indictment. Later, Smith’s daughter also reported abuse, leading to a superseding indictment with additional charges.The trial court denied Smith’s motion for relief from prejudicial joinder, which sought to separate the charges involving his stepdaughter from those involving his daughter. The court found the charges were connected by time, purpose, and modus operandi, and that evidence of abuse of one victim would be admissible in a trial concerning the other. The court also allowed Kathy Harvey-Brown, a forensic interviewer with a background in social work, to testify as an expert on delayed disclosure of child sexual abuse, despite Smith’s objections regarding her qualifications.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decisions. The court held that the joinder of charges was proper and did not result in undue prejudice, as the evidence of abuse was interconnected and would be admissible in separate trials. The court also found that Harvey-Brown was qualified to testify based on her extensive training, experience, and familiarity with the relevant research. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in either denying the motion for relief from joinder or in allowing the expert testimony. View "State of Maine v. Smith" on Justia Law