Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court entering a declaratory judgment in favor of Ingrid Doyon, Trustee of the Oscar Olson Jr. Trust, holding that the trial court erred in interpreting a 1941 deed that contained language restriction development of three lots in a subdivision.In 2012, Ingrid Doyon acquired the three lots - Lots 3, 5, and 72 - as trustee of her father's trust. Doyon subsequently conveyed two of the lots but retained her interest in Lot 72. In 2014, Doyon initiated a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that the restrictive covenant burdening Lot 72 permitted her to construct a single family home and garage on the property. The court issued a judgment in favor of Doyon. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the 1941 deed unambiguously limited the construction that could take place on Lot 72 to a garage to be used with Lot 3, subject to certain setback specifications. View "Doyon v. Fantini" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court granting Susan Colucci's complaint for divorce, holding that the court did not have an adequate evidentiary basis from which it could make the findings necessary for it to set aside the parties' dog to the correct party.On appeal, Stephen Colucci argued that the district court erred in awarding the parties' dog, Louise, to Susan because the dog was his nonmarital property. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that because the parties did not present any evidence of who, whether Susan or Stephen, acquired Louise five years before the marriage, the district court should have reopened the record for the parties to submit additional evidence regarding the ownership of Louise prior to entering a final judgment. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colucci v. Colucci" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of five counts of unlawful sexual touching and one count of visual sexual aggression against a child, holding that Defendant received a fair trial with properly admitted expert testimony and a clear guilty verdict.After a third trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in accepting the jury's verdict, that prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of a fair trial, and that the court erred in admitting the State's expert witness's testimony. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court did not clearly err in finding the State's witness to be a qualified expert witness. View "State v. Westgate" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court granting Pamela Dobbins's motion to enforce the terms of a divorce judgment and a later court order acceptable for processing (COAP) federal retirement benefits, holding that the court lacked the authority to order Mark Dobbins to retire.In the COAP, the court stated that Mark was required to retire at age sixty-two. When Mark turned sixty-two years old, Pamela filed a motion to enforce the divorce judgment and COAP. Mark filed a motion for relief from judgment, arguing that the divorce judgment and COAP were ambiguous and that the court was not authorized to require him to retire at a specific age. The district court denied relief, finding that the divorce judgment and the COAP were enforceable as written. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the court lacked the authority to order Mark to retire at a certain age. View "Dobbins v. Dobbins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court affirming a decision of the Town of York Board of Appeals purporting to grant Daniel and Susan Raposa's appeal from a decision of the Town's Code Enforcement Officer (CEO), holding that because the Board's written findings of fact directly nullified its decision to grant the appeal, the matter must be remanded for further proceedings.The Raposas contacted the Town's CEO to express their concern that Joshua Gammon's use of his property was not consistent with his predecessor's lawful nonconforming use. The CEO determined that Gammon's operation of his business on his property was not a change in use from his predecessor's use of the property. On appeal, the Board granted the Raposas' appeal as to the change-of-use issue. In the Board's written decision, however, the Board stated, "The use of the lot by Mr. Gammon's landscaping business does not constitute a change of use but is an intensification of the same use." The superior court affirmed, concluding that the Board's written decision was the operative decision for judicial review. The Supreme Judicial Court held that because the Board's written decision contained factual findings directly contradicting its initial decision, the matter must be remanded for further proceedings. View "Raposa v. Town of York" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing, for lack of standing, Appellant's petition to establish de facto parentage of his stepson, holding that Appellant was entitled to a hearing to determine his standing.Appellant filed a petition to be adjudicated the child's de facto parent after the mother died unexpectedly. With the petition, Appellant included an affidavit alleging facts to support the existence of a de facto parent relationship with the child. The court dismissed the petition for lack of standing, concluding that Appellant could not establish a necessary element of standing even if the facts in his affidavit were true. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant's assertions, if believed, could have led to a find that he had standing; (2) Respondent's affidavit generated disputed material facts that must be resolved to determine Appellant's standing; and (3) the court abused its discretion in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve those factual disputes. View "Libby v. Estabrook" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the business and consumer docket vacating a decision by the Town of Lamoine Board of Appeals that reversed the Town Planning Board's denial of Hard MacQuinn, Inc.'s application for a permit under the Town's site plan review ordinance and affirming and reinstating the Planning Board's decision, holding that the lower court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the Me. R. Civ. P. 80B complaint filed by Friends of Lamoine and Jeffrey Dow as Trustee for the Tweedie Trust was timely; (2) the Board of Appeals properly conducted appellate review of the site plan permit decision rather than de novo review; (3) the Planning Board’s findings in denying the permit were supported by substantial evidence; and (4) MacQuinn's argument that the Planning Board should have waived a criterion of the ordinance as duplicative or inapplicable did not require discussion. View "Friends of Lamoine v. Town of Lamoine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court terminating Defendant's deferred disposition and imposing sentence following his earlier guilty plea to trafficking in prison contraband, holding that the court did not err in admitting evidence at the termination hearing that had been suppressed in a separate criminal case.Defendant pleaded guilty to trafficking in prison contraband, and the court deferred disposition on that count. Defendant was subsequently indicted on new criminal charges. The court granted Defendant's motion to suppress evidence resulting from a police officer's search of his pocket on the basis that the search was unconstitutional. The State then dismissed the charges. In the first case, the State moved to terminate Defendant's deferred disposition based on his alleged new criminal conduct. Defendant sought an order continuing suppression of the evidence. The court denied Defendant's motion. The court then found that Defendant had violated the deferred disposition agreement and imposed sentence. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because the "sole purpose" of the exclusionary rule was satisfied by the exclusion of the evidence derived from the unlawful search in the dismissed criminal case, the trial court did not err in ruling that the suppressed evidence could be considered in the deferred disposition termination proceeding. View "State v. Hourdeh" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Father and Mother's parental rights to their five children, holding that the district court's findings were sufficient to support the court's ultimate determination that the parents were unable to protect the children from jeopardy or take responsibility for them in a time reasonably calculated to meet their needs.On appeal, the parents argued that the efforts of the Department of Health and Human Services to rehabilitate the parents and reunify them with the children were insufficient and that the court erred in determining that the termination of the parents' parental rights was in the children's best interests. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) competent evidence support the court's finding that the Department's efforts were reasonable under the circumstances of this case; and (2) the court did not commit clear error or abuse its discretion when it determined that the termination of the parents' parental rights was in the children's best interests. View "In re Children of Jacob S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother's parental rights to her child, holding that the record supported the court's findings that Mother was an unfit parent and that termination of her parental rights was in the child's best interest.After a hearing, the court entered a judgment terminating Mother's parental rights to her child, finding that Mother was an unfit parent and that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court's supported findings were sufficient to support its determinations. View "In re Child of Shai F." on Justia Law