Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Rochelle Gleason was convicted of aggravated trafficking of a scheduled drug that caused the death of a person. In October 2021, Gleason communicated with the decedent about purchasing fentanyl and heroin. On October 16, 2021, the decedent bought drugs from Gleason, consumed them, and died of acute intoxication from fentanyl and kratom. The Maine Office of the Chief Medical Examiner sent a blood sample to a lab, where several employees conducted tests. A forensic toxicologist, Chelsea Deisher, reviewed the data and documentation and developed a toxicology report indicating the presence of fentanyl and kratom in the decedent’s blood.The State charged Gleason on September 28, 2022, and she pleaded not guilty. During the trial, Deisher testified about the test results, although she did not conduct the tests herself. Gleason objected, arguing that her Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against her was violated because she could not cross-examine the actual testers. The trial court allowed Deisher’s testimony, and the jury found Gleason guilty. She was sentenced to eighteen years in prison, with all but eight years suspended, and four years of probation. Gleason appealed the conviction.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case, focusing on the Confrontation Clause issue. The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Arizona, issued during the appeal, rejected the rationale that allowed experts to testify based on out-of-court statements not admitted for their truth. The court found that Deisher’s testimony relied on the truth of the data and documentation generated by others, which Gleason could not cross-examine. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial to determine whether the statements relied upon by Deisher were testimonial. View "State of Maine v. Gleason" on Justia Law

Kathleen M. Barron filed for divorce from John D. Barron in April 2022. The District Court in Bangor held a contested bench trial where both parties testified and submitted evidence, including proposed calculations for the division of assets. The court ordered John to make a $57,790.17 payment to Kathleen to equalize the division of property, or the marital home, which also houses John's business, would be sold.John appealed the decision, arguing that the court did not make sufficient findings to support the equalization payment. He had filed a post-judgment motion for further findings of fact, which the trial court denied. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court noted that the divorce judgment lacked specific findings regarding the valuation and classification of assets, making appellate review impossible. The court highlighted that the trial court must provide express factual findings based on the record to support its decisions.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment in part and remanded the case for further findings. The court emphasized that the trial court must independently assess the valuation evidence before equitably dividing marital property. The judgment was vacated concerning the distribution of property, while the remainder of the judgment was affirmed. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, allowing the trial court discretion to reopen the evidence if necessary. View "Barron v. Barron" on Justia Law

Aaron A. Robshaw was convicted by a jury in the Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket for gross sexual assault (Class A), unlawful sexual contact (Class A), and unlawful sexual contact (Class B) against a minor. The incidents occurred in 2018 and 2019 when the victim was ten and eleven years old. The victim disclosed the abuse to her mother in 2019 and fully revealed the extent of the abuse four years later. During the trial, the State presented expert testimony on child victims' delayed disclosure of sexual abuse, which Robshaw objected to, arguing it would improperly bolster the victim's credibility.The trial court allowed the expert testimony, and after the State rested its case, the court granted Robshaw’s motion for judgment of acquittal on one count of gross sexual assault. The jury found Robshaw guilty on the remaining counts. The court sentenced Robshaw to twenty years' imprisonment followed by twenty years of supervised release. Robshaw appealed the conviction and sentence, arguing improper admission of expert testimony, misapplication of the law in sentencing, and abuse of discretion in imposing supervised release.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony, as it was limited to general information about delayed disclosure and did not directly bolster the victim's credibility. The court also found that the trial court properly applied the sentencing analysis, setting the basic term of imprisonment at the legislatively mandated minimum of twenty years and considering aggravating and mitigating factors. The court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a twenty-year period of supervised release, as it appropriately considered the need to protect the public and Robshaw’s history of sexual offenses. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, sentence, and period of supervised release. View "State of Maine v. Robshaw" on Justia Law

Heath G. Demerchant was convicted of domestic violence assault (Class C) after a jury trial. The incident involved Demerchant grabbing his wife's throat and hitting her during an argument about a debit card. The State presented testimony from the victim, witnesses, and police officers. Demerchant argued that his actions were justified under the competing harms justification, claiming he was preventing imminent harm to another person.The trial court denied Demerchant's request for a jury instruction on the competing harms justification, finding insufficient evidence of imminent physical harm to another. The jury found Demerchant guilty, and he was sentenced to five years in prison, with all but three years suspended, and four years of probation.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that there was no evidence of a specific and imminent threat of physical harm to justify the competing harms instruction. The court emphasized that the justification requires evidence of an imminent threat, which was not present in this case. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the requested jury instruction. View "State of Maine v. Demerchant" on Justia Law

In 1996, Katherine Stovall, while employed at New England Telephone Company, experienced pain in her hands and wrists due to a work-related injury. By 1998, the pain had spread, leading her to take a leave of absence. She returned to work in 1999 but ultimately stopped working in June 2001 due to increased pain. Stovall notified her employer of a new injury/aggravation in August 2001. In 2004, she filed petitions for benefits for both the 1996 and 2001 injuries. In 2006, a hearing officer awarded her benefits for the 2001 injury but not for the 1996 injury, which she had withdrawn.The Workers’ Compensation Board hearing officer found that the 2001 injury was a significant aggravation of the 1996 injury. In 2011, New England Telephone filed a petition to review the benefits, asserting that the 520-week limit on compensation payments had been reached. The hearing officer granted the petition, finding that Stovall had achieved maximum medical improvement and had no permanent impairment from the 2001 injury.Stovall filed a petition for restoration of benefits for the 1996 injury in 2017, nearly eleven years after payments for the 1996 injury had ceased. An ALJ denied the petition as time-barred, concluding that Stovall had not shown that New England Telephone was on notice that its payments for the 2001 injury were related to the 1996 injury. The Appellate Division vacated this decision, ruling that the payments for the 2001 injury tolled the statute of limitations for the 1996 injury.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Appellate Division's decision, holding that Stovall failed to prove that New England Telephone was on notice that its payments for the 2001 injury were related to the 1996 injury. The case was remanded for the Appellate Division to affirm the denial of Stovall’s petition as time-barred. View "Stovall v. New England Telephone Company" on Justia Law

Jarae Lipscombe was convicted by a jury of hindering apprehension or prosecution (Class B) for actions taken to delay or prevent the apprehension of his brother, who was later charged with homicide in Waterville. Lipscombe provided false information to the police and assisted his brother in avoiding capture. Five months after his conviction, Lipscombe moved for a new trial, arguing that his brother's acquittal of murder would likely lead to a different outcome in his own case. The trial court denied the motion, and Lipscombe appealed.The Kennebec County trial court held a three-day jury trial where Lipscombe's defense focused on his lack of knowledge regarding his brother's involvement in the homicide. The State presented evidence showing that Lipscombe gave a false description to the police, knew the police were seeking his brother, and made arrangements for his brother to stay at a friend's house. Additionally, Lipscombe confessed to witnessing his brother shoot the victim and offered money to retrieve the weapon. After the jury found Lipscombe guilty, he appealed the judgment, which was affirmed by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed Lipscombe's appeal of the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial. The court held that the acquittal of Lipscombe's brother was irrelevant to Lipscombe's conviction. The court explained that the statute defining hindering apprehension or prosecution does not require proof of the brother's guilt but rather that Lipscombe knew of his brother's conduct that could render him liable to a charge of murder. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the brother's acquittal did not change the factual circumstances of the conduct Lipscombe witnessed. View "State of Maine v. Lipscombe" on Justia Law

Newfield Sand, a Maine corporation engaged in mineral extraction, owns a nearly three-hundred-acre parcel in the Town of Newfield. In 1994, the Planning Board granted a permit to the previous owner for a five-acre gravel-extraction operation with specific conditions on hours of operation and truck trips. Newfield Sand acquired the property in 1998 and sought to expand its operations. In May 2022, Newfield Sand applied for a conditional use permit to operate on thirty acres of open pit at a time and extract minerals from about eighty-five acres. The Planning Board approved the application in November 2023, subject to conditions, including provisions allowing the Board to reevaluate the hours of operation and truck trip limits.The Business and Consumer Docket affirmed the Planning Board’s decision. Newfield Sand appealed, arguing that the Planning Board lacked the authority to retain jurisdiction and modify permit conditions post-approval. The Town contended that the Board’s authority to impose such conditions was implied.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and concluded that the ordinance did not explicitly or implicitly authorize the Planning Board to modify or revoke a permit after issuance or retain jurisdiction over it. The Court found that the conditions allowing reevaluation of hours of operation and truck trips were outside the Board’s authority and did not clearly define compliance requirements. Consequently, the Court vacated the lower court’s judgment and remanded the matter to the Planning Board for further consideration of Newfield Sand’s application for a conditional use permit. View "Newfield Sand v. Town of Newfield" on Justia Law

Sokunthim Nou appeals from a divorce judgment entered by the District Court in which the court allocated property between her and Rotanak Huot and awarded shared parental rights and responsibilities and shared residency of their children. Sokunthim challenges the court’s property determinations on multiple grounds, but does not contest the custody determination. The court found that all the parties’ assets were marital because they were acquired during the marriage and through significant effort by both parties. The court allocated just over half of the net value of the parties’ properties to Sokunthim and the remainder to Rotanak. The court also found Sokunthim’s income to be $435,598, based largely on Rotanak’s testimony about Punky’s LLC’s daily sales.The District Court held a trial with both parties represented by counsel and interpreters present. The court heard testimony from the parties, a real estate broker, Sokunthim’s accountant, and her father. The court entered a comprehensive divorce judgment, determining that all the parties’ assets were marital and allocating them accordingly. The court’s judgment awarded Panyah LLC to Rotanak and implicitly awarded Punky’s LLC to Sokunthim. Sokunthim filed motions for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law and for a new trial, which the court denied.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the trial court’s determination of Sokunthim’s income was unsupported by the evidence. The court’s finding as to her income may have influenced other financial aspects of the judgment. Therefore, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the division of property and child support award and remanded for further proceedings. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "Nou v. Huot" on Justia Law

Marc A. Lesperance was found with his dog off-leash in Baxter Woods, Portland, despite a city ordinance requiring dogs to be leashed from April 1 to July 31. A park ranger informed Lesperance of the rule, but Lesperance refused to comply. The ranger, after consulting with a colleague, issued a summons and complaint. The District Court (Portland) fined Lesperance $500, noting it was not his first violation of the ordinance.Lesperance appealed, arguing that the park ranger was not authorized to issue the summons and complaint. He also claimed the city ordinance was preempted by state law and unconstitutionally vague. The court found these arguments without merit, stating the ordinance was clear and not preempted by state law.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court considered whether the park ranger, appointed as a constable, needed to meet specific training requirements to enforce the ordinance. The Attorney General, representing the Maine Criminal Justice Academy, suggested that constables might require less rigorous training than law enforcement officers. The court applied the "de facto officer" doctrine, concluding that Lesperance could not challenge the ranger's authority based on potential training deficiencies. The court affirmed the judgment, validating the ranger's actions as those of a de facto officer. View "City of Portland v. Lesperance" on Justia Law

Kiril Lozanov and Capital City Renewables, Inc. (CCR) appealed a Superior Court decision granting summary judgment in favor of Lily B. Piel. Lozanov and CCR alleged that Piel, a former employee, accessed and disclosed Lozanov’s personal emails without authorization, which included confidential information about a wind project unrelated to CCR. Lozanov claimed that Piel’s actions led to increased child support obligations and health issues due to stress from related litigation.The Superior Court dismissed CCR’s claim for intrusion upon seclusion, as the company did not have a right to privacy in Lozanov’s emails. Lozanov’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was also dismissed, as the court found Piel’s conduct was not outrageous enough to warrant such a claim. The court allowed Lozanov’s intrusion upon seclusion claim to proceed but ultimately granted summary judgment for Piel on all counts, finding no evidence that Piel’s actions caused the alleged damages.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. The court found no evidence that Piel breached any duty owed to CCR or that her actions caused the damages claimed by Lozanov and CCR. The court also concluded that CCR's and Lozanov’s damages were too remote and speculative to support their claims. Additionally, the court noted that public policy considerations barred recovery, as Lozanov’s attempt to hide assets in a child support proceeding was contrary to the best interests of the child and public policy. View "Capital City Renewables, Inc. v. Piel" on Justia Law