Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order denying Appellant's motion to dissolve an ex parte attachment entered by the superior court, holding that the court applied an incorrect standard of proof in its order on the motion to dissolve.The Portland Museum of Art (PMA) filed a complaint against Appellant alleging tortious interference with expected inheritance and undue influence and requesting an accounting. The PMA then filed an ex parte motion for attachment and trustee process, which the superior court granted. Thereafter, Appellant unsuccessfully filed a motion to dissolve the attachment and trustee process. The court denied the motion to dissolve, ruling that there was a reasonable likelihood that PMA would recover judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order denying the motion to dissolve attachment, holding (1) the court unambiguously articulated the incorrect standard of proof in its order on the motion to dissolve; and (2) the misstatement of the standard was not harmless. View "Portland Museum of Art v. Germain" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court convicting Defendant of aggravated assault and violating a condition of release, holding that the sanctions imposed on the State were sufficient to remedy the prejudice caused by discovery violations and that there were no other errors in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Court held (1) the court did not abuse its discretion to impose sanctions for the State's discovery violations; and (2) Defendant was not deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury that represented a fair cross section of Defendant's community, and accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new jury. View "State v. Townes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing Appellant's petition for post-conviction review asserting that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at a probation revocation hearing, holding that the trial court did not err but, as recently announced in Petgrave v. State, __ A.3d ___ (2019), Defendant now has a procedure by which he can pursue his claim.In Petgrave, the Supreme Judicial Court held that a defendant has a right to the effective assistance of counsel at a revocation hearing and that a defendant who contends that he or she received ineffective assistance of counsel at a probation revocation hearing may pursue that claim by filing a properly supported motion for a new trial pursuant to M.R.U. Crim. P. 33. In the instant case, the Court held that Appellant may file a motion for a new revocation hearing in the trial court within thirty-five days following the issuance of the Court's mandate. View "Gould v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's complaint seeking to be determined a de facto parent of Appellee's adopted child, holding that the district court erred in dismissing this case for lack of standing.The district court dismissed Appellant's complaint for lack of standing. On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to hold a hearing to determine disputed facts and in concluding that Appellee's refusal to allow Appellant to adopt the child was dispositive of the issue of whether Appellee acknowledged or behaved as though Appellant was a parent to the child. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case, holding that the court's treatment of the single fact of Appellee's refusal to allow Appellant to adopt as dispositive in the standing analysis constituted an error of law, and the court should have held a hearing to determine disputed facts regarding the issue of standing. View "Young v. King" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Spurwink Services, Inc. on the claim filed by Sydney and Patricia TerMorshuizen for overtime pay pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 26, 664, holding that interruptions to "sleep time" are not compensable under section 664.The TerMorshuizens worked as a therapeutic couple at Spurwink's day and residential treatment program for children and adolescents with significant emotional and behavioral needs. The TerMorshuizens, who lived in the residence with the children, brought suit seeking overtime wages, arguing that, while Spurwink paid them for sleep time interruptions, they were entitled to payment for other client interruptions that prevented them from sleeping, regardless of whether those interruptions actually required direct client interaction. The trial court granted summary judgment for Spurwink on the grounds that Spurwink's sleep time compensation policy was in compliance with federal law and was reasonable as a matter of law. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in (1) applying section 29 C.F.R. 785.23 to determine whether sleep time constitutes compensable work time; and (2) determining that Spurwink's sleep time policy was reasonable as a matter of law. View "TerMorshuizen v. Spurwink Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother's parental rights to her child, holding that Mother had a right to the effective assistance of counsel at the proceeding where she consented to the termination of her parental rights and that Mother received effective assistance when she voluntarily gave her consent.At a hearing, Mother advised the court that she had decided to consent to a termination of her parental rights. Satisfied that Mother's decision was knowing and voluntary, the court ordered that Mother's parental rights be terminated. Mother later filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 59, arguing that her consent was involuntary and that she had received ineffective assistance of counsel in giving consent. The court denied Mother's request to set aside her consent. Mother also filed a Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) motion for relief from the termination judgment based on counsel's alleged ineffective assistance. The court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court did not clearly err in finding that Mother voluntarily consented to a termination of her parental rights or in denying the Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief without holding a second evidentiary hearing. View "In re Child of Rebecca J." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of aggravated criminal mischief and did not reach the State's claim of error on cross-appeal, holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to rationally find and conclude that the State proved each element of the offense of aggravated criminal mischief beyond a reasonable doubt.On appeal, Defendant argued that the State had not proved that he had damaged the "property of another" - a critical element of aggravated criminal mischief. On cross-appeal, the State challenged the denial of its motion to correct the sentence because the court did not order restitution. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury rationally could have inferred that Defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused damage to the property of another; and (2) because the State failed to file an appeal and obtain the written approval of the Attorney General to appeal the court's decision, this Court did not reach the State's claim of error. View "State v. Ouellette" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's convictions for failure to sign a criminal summons, refusing to submit to arrest by physical force, and assault, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding from evidence a cellphone video taken by the defendant's sister that showed some of the events that occurred during Defendant's arrest.Specifically, the Court held (1) because the trial court did not rely on Me. R. Evid. 403 when excluding the video at issue and because the video was properly authenticated, the court's refusal to admit the video so that the jury could view it was an abuse of discretion; and (2) the trial court's exclusion of the video was not harmless error. View "State v. Hussein" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father to their child pursuant to Maine's Child and Family Services and Child Protection Act, 22 Me. Rev. Stat. 4001 to 4099-H, and the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C.S. 1901-1963, holding that the district court did not err in terminating the parents' parental rights and denying their other requests for relief.Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court did not err by concluding that active efforts had been made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, as required by ICWA; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the court's determination that Mother was parentally unfit within the meaning of state law; (3) the district court did not err in denying Father's two motions to transfer the case to the Penobscot Nation Tribal Court; and (4) the district court did not err in denying Father's post-judgment motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. View "In re Child of Radience K." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing Appellant's petition for post-conviction review alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in his probation revocation matter but that Appellant may file a motion for a new probation revocation hearing in the trial court within thirty-five days of the issuance of this mandate.The trial court concluded that Appellant's remedy for any claim of error arising from the revocation was to seek a discretionary appeal, as Appellant had already done. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) in a probation revocation hearing, a defendant has a right to the effective assistance of counsel; (2) Appellant's motion was properly dismissed, but Appellant was deprived of an opportunity to obtain meaningful review on his claim; and (3) a defendant who seeks to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel after a probation revocation hearing may do so by filing a motion under Rule 33 of the Maine Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure for a new trial, which must be filed thirty-five days after the entry of judgment, and the judge who issued the revocation judgment will, if the defendant has made out a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance, will hold an evidentiary hearing or dismiss the motion. View "Petgrave v. State" on Justia Law