Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court dismissing Petitioner’s complaint seeking review of a disciplinary decision of the Department of Corrections. In dismissing the petition, the superior court entered sua sponte a decision stating that the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The record was otherwise devoid of any indication of the basis on which the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Judicial Court held that no jurisdictional defect was apparent from the record and remanded the matter to the superior court for the court to act on Petitioner’s application to proceed without payment of fees. View "Anctil v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Ranked-choice voting is the current statutory law of Maine for the primary elections scheduled for June 12, 2018.The superior court reported seven questions to the Supreme Judicial Court addressing the Secretary of State’s planned implementation of ranked-choice voting in Maine’s primary elections to be held on June 12, 2018. The Court answered Question 3 on its merits and held (1) the Court assumes without deciding that the Maine Senate has standing to seek a declaration regarding the legal status of ranked-choice voting in the June 2018 primary elections and to challenge in court the operational planning of the Secretary of State; (2) the answer to Question 3 is that ranked-choice voting is Maine’s statutory law for the June 2018 primary elections; (3) Questions 1 and 2 are not justiciable; and (4) the remaining questions are moot. View "Maine Senate v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother’s parental rights to her daughter pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii), holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding of parental unfitness and its determination that termination was in the child’s best interest. Specifically, the Court held that given the lower court’s findings of fact, all of which were supported by competent evidence in the record, the court did not err in its finding of parental unfitness or in determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights, with a permanency plan of adoption, was in the child’s best interest. View "In re Child of Portia L." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Father’s parental rights to his child pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii), holding that the court did not err in its parental unfitness and best interest determinations and that Father was not denied due process. The Court held (1) the district court did not err by determining that Father was unfit because he was unable to “meet his son’s special needs and take responsibility for him in a reasonable time to meet those needs” and to “protect his son from jeopardy in a reasonable time to meet his needs” and that termination was in the child’s best interest; and (2) Father was not denied due process. View "In re Child of James R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Father’s parental rights to his child pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii), holding that the court did not err in its parental unfitness and best interest determinations and that Father was not denied due process. The Court held (1) the district court did not err by determining that Father was unfit because he was unable to “meet his son’s special needs and take responsibility for him in a reasonable time to meet those needs” and to “protect his son from jeopardy in a reasonable time to meet his needs” and that termination was in the child’s best interest; and (2) Father was not denied due process. View "In re Child of James R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of divorce, defaulting Husband, holding that the district court did not err in determining that service by publication was adequate.When Wife filed a complaint for protection from abuse against Husband, Husband fled to Florida in order to evade service of process. Two months later, Wife prepared a complaint for divorce from Husband, but neither she nor the sheriff’s office was able to find him to serve him with the divorce complaint. The district court granted a motion for service of the divorce complaint by alternate means, allowing Wife to effect service by publishing notice of the complaint in the Lewiston Sun Journal. When Father failed to appear at the divorce hearing, the district court entered a judgment of divorce defaulting Husband. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Me. R. Civ. P. 4 did not impose a requirement that a copy of the order granting alternate service be personally delivered to Husband; and (2) the district court’s decision not to require Wife to send an email to Husband’s possible email address or notify Husband’s attorney of the order for service by publication did not result in a failure of due process. View "Schulz v. Doeppe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment entered by the district court denying Father’s Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment after the court granted Mother’s motion to modify a parental rights and responsibilities order regarding the parties’ son. On appeal, Father argued that the court erred in denying his motion because (1) after another state assumed jurisdiction over the child custody matter, Maine necessarily lost jurisdiction over that matter; and (2) the court erred by not allowing him to present facts and legal arguments to the court before a decision on jurisdiction was made. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) Maine maintained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the child custody matter pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 19-A, 1746(1); and (2) the court acted within the confines of section 1740(2), and because Father on two occasions had already presented facts and legal arguments regarding jurisdiction, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father a third opportunity to address the matter. View "Fitzpatrick v. McCrary" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of foreclosure entered by the superior court in favor of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, holding that the superior court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence a copy of a notice of default that contained an assertion that it was sent by mail.In answer to a complaint for foreclosure filed by Deutsche Bank, Jesse and Naomi Eddins asserted that the Bank failed to comply with the notice provisions of Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6111. The matter proceeded to trial. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter for entry of judgment for the Eddinses, holding that Deutsche Bank presented no competent evidence that a notice of default was sent to Jesse or that any such notice met the requirements of either section 6111 or the mortgage instrument itself. Therefore, the Bank failed as a matter of law to prove a necessary element of its foreclosure claim, and the Eddinses were entitled to judgment. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Eddins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of foreclosure entered by the superior court in favor of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, holding that the superior court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence a copy of a notice of default that contained an assertion that it was sent by mail.In answer to a complaint for foreclosure filed by Deutsche Bank, Jesse and Naomi Eddins asserted that the Bank failed to comply with the notice provisions of Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6111. The matter proceeded to trial. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter for entry of judgment for the Eddinses, holding that Deutsche Bank presented no competent evidence that a notice of default was sent to Jesse or that any such notice met the requirements of either section 6111 or the mortgage instrument itself. Therefore, the Bank failed as a matter of law to prove a necessary element of its foreclosure claim, and the Eddinses were entitled to judgment. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Eddins" on Justia Law

The evidence presented to the Secretary of State’s hearing examiner supported the determination that Walter Melevsky III failed to submit to a test of his blood-alcohol concentration, and therefore, the hearing examiner properly denied Melevsky’s petition to rescind the administrative suspension of his driver’s license.The superior court vacated the hearing examiner’s decision and ordered the Secretary of State to reinstate Melevsky’s driver’s license, concluding that the Secretary’s decision was erroneous as a matter of law. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding that the hearing examiner’s determination that Melevsky failed to submit to a test of his blood-alcohol level was supported by substantial evidence. View "Melevsky v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law