Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, a couple, Joseph R. and his wife, sought to adopt the wife's two minor children and terminate the parental rights of the children's biological father. The mother had been granted sole parental rights and responsibilities in a 2016 divorce judgment, and the biological father, who resides in Scotland, had not had contact with the children or the mother since the divorce. The couple married in 2017 and filed their petitions for adoption, change of name, and termination of parental rights in the York County Probate Court in April 2023.The York County Probate Court dismissed the couple's petitions, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to recent legislative changes. Specifically, the court cited the enactment of 19-A M.R.S. § 1658(1-A) in 2021, which it interpreted as giving exclusive jurisdiction to the District Court in cases involving one parent's attempt to terminate another parent's parental rights to a minor child. The couple appealed this decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of the statute. The court noted that the Probate Court has exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for adoption and termination of parental rights proceedings brought pursuant to section 9-204. The court found that the language in section 1658(1-A) does not divest the Probate Court of subject matter jurisdiction in this matter. The court further examined the legislative history of section 1658 and concluded that section 1658(1-A) applies only to termination petitions brought pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1658 and does not divest the Probate Court of its subject matter jurisdiction over termination petitions filed in conjunction with adoption proceedings under 18-C M.R.S. § 9-103. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Adoption by Joseph R." on Justia Law

The case revolves around Delanna Garey, who was employed as the director of operations of an apartment building managed by Stanford Management until her termination in January 2023. In February 2023, Stanford and its current director of operations, Eve Dunham, requested the Rumford Police to serve Garey with a criminal trespass notice, barring her from entering the building for a year. In March 2023, Stanford and Dunham posted copies of the criminal trespass notice on the building and sent a letter to the residents stating that former employees were not permitted on the premises. Garey filed a complaint against Stanford alleging defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and reckless or intentional infliction of emotional distress, and seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.The Superior Court granted Stanford’s motion to dismiss Garey’s complaint in its entirety, concluding that Garey failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. The court reasoned that Stanford’s statements were not provably false; they were statements of opinion, not of fact; the statements were subject to multiple interpretations and should not be attributed their worst possible meaning; and in the alternative, even if the statements were defamatory, they were conditionally privileged.Upon review, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded that Garey met her burden and vacated the Superior Court judgment with respect to her claims for defamation per se and false light invasion of privacy. The court affirmed the dismissal of her claims for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief as moot. The court found that Garey’s complaint sufficiently alleged that Stanford published statements that falsely imply that Garey engaged in dangerous conduct such that the community needs protection. The court also concluded that Garey has sufficiently alleged a claim for false light invasion of privacy. However, Garey’s declaratory judgment and injunctive relief claims were moot because she is no longer precluded from entering the building property. View "Garey v. Stanford Management, LLC" on Justia Law

Corydon Judkins was convicted of domestic violence assault after a jury trial. The case revolved around an incident where the police were called to Judkins' apartment, and the victim alleged that Judkins had assaulted her. The victim's statements were recorded by the responding officer's body camera. However, the victim did not testify at the trial. The State introduced the body camera footage, including the victim's statements, as evidence. Judkins objected, arguing that his constitutional right to confront witnesses was violated as he could not cross-examine the victim. The trial court admitted the footage, citing the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The State conceded that the victim's statements were testimonial and should not have been admitted. The court agreed, stating that once Judkins was removed from the apartment, there was no ongoing emergency that would support the admission of the victim's answers as non-testimonial statements. The court found that the victim's testimonial statements were inadmissible as she did not testify at trial and Judkins had no prior opportunity to cross-examine her.The court then considered whether the error was harmless. It noted that the State relied heavily on the victim's statements in the video to prove its case, and the evidence of Judkins's guilt was not overwhelming. The court also noted that the jury had asked to review the body camera footage during its deliberations. The court concluded that it could not determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim's statements on the body camera recording did not affect the verdict. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State of Maine v. Judkins" on Justia Law

The defendant, James A. Green, was convicted of operating under the influence (OUI) after being found slumped over in his vehicle at a green traffic light. The arresting officer noticed signs of impairment, conducted field sobriety tests, and arrested Green. Another officer, trained as a Drug Recognition Expert (DRE), evaluated Green and found evidence of drug use. Green was charged and pleaded not guilty.Prior to the trial, Green filed a motion to limit the DRE's testimony, arguing that the DRE should not be qualified as an expert under Maine Rule of Evidence 702. He also claimed that the State violated discovery rules by not providing an additional expert witness report from the DRE. The trial court reserved ruling on the DRE's opinions and stated that it would address the issues during the trial if necessary. During the trial, the DRE testified extensively about his background, credentials, and experience, and gave his opinion as a DRE. Green did not object to the DRE's qualifications or opinions during the trial.The jury found Green guilty, and he appealed, arguing that the State violated discovery rules and that the DRE should have been qualified as an expert witness before offering his opinion. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, affirming the conviction. The court found that the State had provided the DRE's report as part of automatic discovery, fulfilling its obligations under the Maine Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure 16. The court also found that the DRE's testimony went beyond lay opinion testimony and was informed by his training and certification as a drug recognition expert. However, since Green did not object to the DRE's qualifications or opinions during the trial, his objection was unpreserved and was reviewed for obvious error. The court found no error that deprived Green of a fair trial or resulted in a serious injustice. View "State v. Green" on Justia Law

Wade T. Hamilton, a pediatric cardiologist, recommended a patient for a cardiac MRI scan but warned her that due to her COVID-19 vaccination, which he claimed included "magnets and heavy metals", it would be unsafe for her to enter an MRI machine. The patient's mother reported Hamilton's statements to the nurse practitioner who had referred the patient to Hamilton, leading to a report being filed against Hamilton with the Board of Licensure in Medicine. The Board, in response, opened a complaint proceeding and demanded that Hamilton undergo a neuropsychological evaluation.Hamilton challenged the Board's order in the Superior Court, arguing that the Board had overstepped its authority and violated his rights to due process and free speech. However, the Superior Court denied his petition and ruled in favor of the Board. Shortly before this decision, Hamilton's medical license in Maine expired and he did not renew it.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court dismissed Hamilton's appeal as nonjusticiable, stating that there had been no final agency action and that the challenged order was moot because Hamilton had allowed his medical license to lapse. The court also noted that Hamilton's challenge to the order directing the evaluation was fully reviewable at the conclusion of the complaint proceedings, making his petition premature. Furthermore, since Hamilton was no longer licensed in Maine, the Board no longer had authority to pursue his evaluation. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court for dismissal of the petition for judicial review as nonjusticiable. View "Hamilton v. Board of Licensure in Medicine" on Justia Law

The case involves Nicholas P. Lovejoy, who was convicted of intentional or knowing murder. Lovejoy appealed his conviction, arguing that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from an allegedly unlawful traffic stop and a subsequent warrantless search of his home. He also contended that the court abused its discretion in considering his mental state and post-crime conduct in its sentencing analysis.Prior to Lovejoy's conviction, his case was heard in the trial court where he entered a conditional guilty plea. The court denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the traffic stop and the search of his home. Lovejoy was subsequently convicted and sentenced to forty-two years of incarceration.In the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, Lovejoy's appeal was reviewed. The court found that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion and that the warrantless search of his home was a reasonable response to what law enforcement knew at the time to be an exigent circumstance. The court also concluded that it did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Lovejoy. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "State of Maine v. Lovejoy" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the estate of Linda C. Giguere, who passed away in 2021. Her will, dated 2013, nominated her husband, William Giguere, as the personal representative and established a trust for his benefit if she predeceased him. The will also stated that upon William's death, the remaining balance would be paid to his children. However, the will did not provide for the disposition of Linda’s residuary estate if William predeceased her, which he did in 2015. Linda did not execute a new will after William’s death. The will also explicitly stated that Linda's estranged daughter, Hilary Barlow, was to receive nothing.In the Cumberland County Probate Court, Hilary Barlow filed an application for the informal appointment of a personal representative of her mother’s estate. The court appointed Hilary as personal representative. Later, Eric and Mark Giguere, William's sons, filed petitions for the formal probate of the will and appointment of a personal representative. The court removed Hilary as personal representative and appointed Attorney LeBlanc as successor personal representative. Attorney LeBlanc filed a petition for instructions, asserting that the 2013 will did not dispose of Linda’s estate because it made no provision for the disposition of the residuary estate in the event that William predeceased Linda.The Probate Court rejected the request to reform the 2013 will to name Eric and Mark as residuary devisees, stating that the evidence was not clear and convincing. The court concluded that since the 2013 will did not fully dispose of Linda’s estate, the residuary estate passed by intestate succession to Hilary.On appeal to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, Eric and Mark argued that the Probate Court’s finding was against the preponderance of the believable evidence. They contended that the absence of a provision disposing of the residuary estate must have been a scrivener's error. However, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Probate Court’s judgment, stating that Eric and Mark failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Linda intended that they be the residuary devisees of her estate if William predeceased Linda. The court also concluded that the 2013 will did not provide for the disposition of Linda’s residuary estate in the event she survived William, and thus those assets passed by way of intestate succession to Hilary. View "Estate of Giguere" on Justia Law

Tammy and James Rutledge filed a lawsuit against Pamela Menard and Randall Nappi, seeking to recover personal property. The Rutledges followed the instructions on Form CV-218, which was available on the Maine Judicial Branch's website, to serve the defendants. This form was created during the COVID-19 pandemic and instructed plaintiffs to prepare for a telephonic status conference as the first court event. However, by the time the Rutledges filed their lawsuit, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court had rescinded most of the pandemic management orders, and court proceedings had returned to an in-person format.The District Court (Bridgton, Malia, J.) dismissed the Rutledges' complaint with prejudice due to their failure to appear in person for a hearing. The Rutledges had mistakenly believed that the initial court proceeding would be a telephonic status conference, as per the instructions on Form CV-218. They appealed the decision, arguing that the court erred in dismissing their case with prejudice and denying their post-judgment motion to reopen the case or amend the judgment to a dismissal without prejudice.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court found that the District Court did not err in finding that the Rutledges failed to appear. However, it held that the dismissal with prejudice was too drastic a sanction given the circumstances. The court noted that the Judicial Branch's website continued to direct parties to Form CV-218, which no longer reflected current court practices, contributing to the Rutledges' mistaken belief. The court also noted that the Rutledges' nonappearance was neither deliberate nor the result of misconduct, and they made a sustained effort to remedy their error. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the District Court for entry of a judgment of dismissal without prejudice. View "Rutledge v. Menard" on Justia Law

Jamie Pacheco filed a divorce case against her then-husband, Kevin Pacheco, in 2015. She was represented by Jeffrey Bennett, Esq., and his firm, Legal-Ease, LLC, P.A. During the divorce proceedings, Bennett voluntarily produced to Kevin's counsel, Libby, O’Brien, Kingsley, and Champion, LLC, the complete counseling session notes of Jamie’s therapist, Sandra Falsey, with one redacted line. Libby later subpoenaed Falsey without notifying Bennett and obtained her complete counseling records related to Jamie, including the unredacted therapy notes. After the divorce proceedings concluded, Jamie, still represented by Bennett, filed an action against Libby asserting claims of abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) based on Libby obtaining Falsey’s unredacted therapy notes and disclosing them to Kevin.The Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Stewart, J.) had previously granted a motion to dismiss Jamie’s tort complaint. However, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court partially vacated the dismissal, leaving Jamie’s claims of abuse of process and IIED in dispute. Later, Libby filed a motion to disqualify Bennett, asserting that Bennett’s continued representation of Jamie would violate Maine Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7 and prejudice Libby. The Superior Court granted Libby’s motion, finding that Bennett is likely to be a necessary witness on several topics related to the case.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Bennett's actions or inactions in the treatment and disclosure of Jamie’s psychotherapy records were central to Jamie’s case, and Bennett alone had this knowledge, making his testimony relevant, material, and unobtainable from other sources. The court also found that there were sound bases in the record for the lower court’s conclusion that there would be actual prejudice in allowing Bennett to continue representing Jamie. View "Pacheco v. Libby, O'Brien, Kingsley and Champion, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Dennis G. Crosen, a former employee of Blouin Motors, Inc., who suffered two work-related injuries in 1984 and 2002, respectively. The 1984 injury occurred while Crosen was working for Rockingham Electric, Inc., and the 2002 injury occurred while he was working for Blouin Motors, Inc. The two injuries combined to render Crosen totally incapacitated. A hearing officer apportioned 40% of the responsibility for Crosen's incapacity to Rockingham and 60% to Blouin. In 2014, Crosen began collecting old-age insurance benefits under the United States Social Security Act. By statute, Blouin's obligation to pay weekly incapacity benefits based on the 2002 injury was to be reduced by half of the amount of Social Security benefits that Crosen receives. No Social Security offset applies to the compensation that Rockingham owes for the 1984 injury.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Workers’ Compensation Board Appellate Division denied Blouin's petition to apply the entire Social Security offset to its compensation payments to Crosen. The ALJ and the Appellate Division interpreted the relevant statute to mean that Blouin could only apply the offset to the portion of the benefits for which it was responsible (60%), not the entire amount.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with the lower courts' interpretation of the statute. The court held that Blouin was entitled to take the full offset provided by the statute, not just the portion corresponding to its share of responsibility for Crosen's incapacity. The court vacated the decision of the Appellate Division and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court also noted that Blouin may be entitled to a credit for the portion of the offset that it did not take prior to this case, but left this issue to be resolved on remand. View "Crosen v. Blouin Motors., Inc." on Justia Law