Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court adjudicating Appellant of the juvenile crime of gross sexual assault. On appeal, Appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the adjudication, that the court deprived him of due process when it denied his motion for production of Department of Health and Human Services records without conducting an in camera review, and that the investigative and adjudicatory processes and the outcome of the case did not comport with the policies of the Juvenile Code. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed and summarily disposed of Appellant’s essential challenges on appeal. In addition, the court noted that the Legislature may wish to review Me. Rev. Stat. 17-A, 253(1)(C) to consider how the statute “is most effectively and appropriately applied in juvenile cases to achieve the purposes of the Juvenile Code.” View "State v. Fulton" on Justia Law

The probate court did not err in adopting the report of a referee and imposing a constructive trust on Plaintiff’s interests in real property, but remand is necessary for the probate court to enter an appropriate judgment.Plaintiff, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Stephen E. Libby, filed a complaint against her brother. Plaintiff’s brother filed a counterclaim against Plaintiff. A referee concluded that Plaintiff committed constructive fraud and recommended the imposition of a constructive trust on certain real estate. The probate court adopted the referee’s report and ordered judgment “entered in the record.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the probate court did not err in adopting the referee’s report; but (2) the court’s docket entry did not comply with rules 58 and 79 of the Maine Rules of Probate Procedure regarding the entry of judgment. The court remanded with directions that the probate court enter an appropriate judgment. View "In re Estate of Stephen E. Libby" on Justia Law

Maine attorneys must obtain a client’s informed consent regarding the scope and effect of any contractual provision that prospectively requires the client to submit malpractice claims against those attorneys to arbitration.The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court denying Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, P.A.’s (Bernstein) motion to compel arbitration in a legal malpractice claim filed against it. The superior court concluded that Bernstein failed to obtain informed consent from Susan Snow, its client, to submit malpractice claims to arbitration and that federal law does not preempt a rule requiring attorneys to obtain such informed consent from their clients. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in concluding that (1) Bernstein’s failure to obtain informed consent from Snow regarding an arbitration provision rendered that provision unenforceable as contrary to public policy; and (2) the Federal Arbitration Act does not preempt a requirement that attorneys obtain informed consent from their clients before contracting to submit disputes to arbitration. View "Snow v. Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, P.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating parents’ parental rights to Bentlee G. pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) and finding jeopardy as to Brenton G. pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4035(2). The court held (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the court’s finding of parental unfitness and its determination that termination of both parents’ rights was in Bentlee’s best interest; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the court’s finding of jeopardy as to Brenton; and (3) to the extent that Mother argued that the court erred in terminating her parental rights to Bentlee because the jeopardy order was defective, her contention was unpersuasive. View "In re Bentlee G." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of Defendants on Bank’s complaint for a residential foreclosure, thus rejecting Bank’s allegations of error.On appeal, Bank argued that the district court erred in denying Bank’s motion to continue the trial and erred in determining that Bank did not lay a proper foundation for admitting loan servicing records pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) Bank did not lay a proper foundation for admitting the loan servicing records at issue pursuant to the business records exception; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bank’s motion for a continuance because Bank did not establish a substantial reason as to why a continuance would further the interests of justice. View "Keybank National Ass’n v. Estate of Eula W. Quint" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother’s parental rights to her child pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii). On appeal, Mother argued that the evidence was insufficient to support both the court’s finding of parental unfitness and its finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. In affirming, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial court did not err in its finding of unfitness as to Mother; and (2) there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. View "In re Addilyn R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the judgment of the superior court permanently enjoining Ronald Champagne from, among other things, “threatening or using physical force or violence against any person by reason of that person’s race, color, religion, sex, ancestry, national origin, physical or mental disability or sexual orientation” in violation of the Maine Civil Rights Act. Champagne filed motions to amend the judgment and for further findings of fact and conclusions of law, asserting that the injunction was overbroad. The superior court denied the motions. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter for the superior court to make findings supporting the granting of and the broad scope of the injunction and to explain its rationale in doing so. View "State v. Champagne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court affirming, pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 80B, the Town of Wiscasset Planning Board’s approval of Allen and Melissa Cohen’s application to expand a building used for the Cohens’ business and dismissed the appeal of the judgments entered for the Town on Kathleen and Thomas Bryant’s independent claims.After the Planning Board approved the Cohens’ site plan review application, the Bryants appealed. The Board of Appeals denied the Bryants’ appeal. The Bryants appealed the Planning Board’s decision to the superior court pursuant to Rule 80B. They also brought three independent claims - two separate counts alleging that the Town had violated their due process rights by denying them notice and an opportunity to be heard and a third count seeking declaratory relief. The superior court affirmed the Planning Board’s decision on the Braynts’ Rule 80B appeal, entered judgments for the Town on the violation of due process claims, and dismissed the count seeking declaratory relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) affirmed with respect to the Rule 80B appeal, holding that the Planning Board did not err in approving the Cohens’ application; and (2) dismissed as moot the appeals with respect to the judgments on the independent claims. View "Bryant v. Town of Wiscasset" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the superior court upholding redactions made by the Department of Corrections in certain documents it sent to Plaintiff pursuant to Plaintiff’s Freedom of Access Act (FOAA) request. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the Department failed to comply with FOAA because the redactions were improper. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment as to certain documents and vacated the judgment as to other documents, holding that select portions of the produced documents were improperly redacted and select portions of the produced documents were properly redacted. View "Anctil v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the business and consumer docket awarding Plaintiff $66,866 in damages in this action alleging that Plaintiff’s property had been damaged by Emera Maine agents while they rebuilt an electrical transmission line and that Emera had not sufficiently repaired the damage. Plaintiff filed his claims against Emera and its contractor, Hawkeye, LLC, and sought several million dollars in damages. After the trial court entered its judgment, Plaintiff appealed and Emera and Hawkeye cross-appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment as modified, holding (1) the trial court’s findings were not clearly erroneous; (2) the trial court did not err when it determined that Hawkeye did not trespass within the meaning of Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 7551-B; and (3) the court by applying the new version of Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 7552(5) in awarding $20,000 in attorney fees to McLaughlin, and the court’s judgment is hereby modified by reducing the award of attorney fees to $1,433. View "McLaughlin v. Emera Maine" on Justia Law