Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court denied Robert M.A. Nadeau’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s June 20, 2017 decision in this judicial disciplinary matter. In his motion, Nadeau argued that the sanctions imposed on him - including a two-year suspension from he practice of law and $5,000 forfeiture - for his numerous violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct violated his equal protection and due process of law rights and also violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the two-year suspension from the practice of law did not violate Nadeau’s rights to equal protection and due process of law; and (2) a sanction affecting Nadeau’s license to practice law was not misplaced. View "In re Robert M.A. Nadeau" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court concluding that the second foreclosure action filed by the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) against Patricia and Paul Deschaine was barred as a matter of law by the judgment dismissing with prejudice Fannie Mae’s earlier foreclosure action against the Deschaines. The first foreclosure action was dismissed with prejudice because the parties failed to comply with the court’s pretrial order. The judgment later became final. The next year, Fannie Mae filed its second complaint for foreclosure involving the same property and based on the same note and mortgage. The superior court granted the Deschaines’ motion for summary judgment on the complaint. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that this second foreclosure claim was precluded by principles of res judicata. View "Federal National Mortgage Association v. Deschaine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Defendant on Plaintiffs’ defamation action. The trial court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to make the necessary prima facie showing that Defendant acted with actual malice. The Supreme Judicial Court held that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that Defendant was entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence of the sort required to establish actual malice - such as evidence of Defendant’s negligence, motive, and intent - and, therefore, Plaintiffs could not prevail at trial. View "Plante v. Long" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the summary judgment entered by the probate court in favor of David Gourevitch, a qualified beneficiary of a 1907 trust, on Gourevitch’s complaint for a declaratory judgment that Maxwell is not a beneficiary of the trust, holding that Gourevitch’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The court additionally held that Gourevitch did not receive the benefit of tolling because he had the full ability to determine why Maxwell was receiving trust income distributions under a circumstance contrary to a certain provision in the trust when he was serving as a trustee but did not commence legal action until twelve years after ending his service as a trustee. View "In re George Parsons 1907 Trust" on Justia Law

Father lived the child and her mother, outside of Maine, until 2008, when the child was about six months old. After that time, he maintained regular contact with the child, who resided primarily in New York, but was never her primary caregiver. In 2016 Mother moved to Maine with the child. Father, who is incarcerated in Massachusetts, did not oppose the move. While he was incarcerated the child asked a neighbor for help and the Maine Department of Health and Human Services commenced a child protection proceeding. Father made no effort to take responsibility. The Department obtained a preliminary protection order, 22 M.R.S. 4032-4036, and placed the child in foster care after hospitalization for psychiatric care. Father was served with notice and provided with appointed counsel, who moved to dismiss the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction because Father is not a Maine resident, has never traveled to Maine,and otherwise lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Maine. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the court’s rejection of that motion. The court was not required to have jurisdiction over Father to have authority to issue a jeopardy order to protect the child. View "In re Emma B." on Justia Law

Parents Theresa Allocca and Timothy Allen Davison, filed this action in their individual capacities, and Davison also filed as personal representative of the Estate of Timothy "Asti" Davison. Asti was fatally shot while operating a vehicle that an assailant, operating another vehicle, had forced onto a median on an interstate highway. The Parents sought uninsured motorist (UM) benefits based on several automobile insurance policies issued by defendants York Insurance Company of Maine, Allstate Insurance Company, and Horace Mann Teachers Insurance Company. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers, concluding that neither any of the policies nor Maine’s UM statute provided coverage for the loss associated with Asti’s death. The Maine Supreme Court affirmed: "[a]lthough the conduct of the person who killed Asti was indisputably deliberate and not accidental, there is no evidence in the record that it was foreseeable to Asti himself, and so, based on that approach, his death would be viewed as 'accidental.' ... describing an intentional act, such as an intentional killing, as an 'accident' stretches the plain meaning of that word too far." Without addressing the superior court’s conclusion that the UM coverage in the policies was not applicable because the loss did not arise from the "use" of a motor vehicle, the Supreme Court concluded as a matter of law that Asti’s death was not caused by an "accident." View "Allocca. v. York Insurance Company of Maine" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction, entered after a jury trial, of operating under the influence. Defendant was stopped by a Winslow police officer after he drove his car over a sidewalk median in Waterville. Defendant argued that the motion court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the Winslow officer’s extraterritorial stop of his vehicle because the officer exceeded the authority granted to him by Me. Rev. Stat. 30-A, 2671 and Winslow, Me., Code 2-44. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances, the motion court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress because the Winslow officer’s action of pursuing Defendant’s vehicle was reasonable, as was his initial contact with Defendant, and the officer did not intentionally make an excursion into Waterville to ferret out crime. View "State v. Turner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of operating under the influence. On appeal, Defendant argued that the court abused its discretion by excluding Defendant’s proposed expert testimony as to her peak blood alcohol concentration at the time she was driving. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding that the court did not err in excluding the expert testimony because Defendant’s offer of proof did not include a proffer of evidence that would demonstrate how her theoretical blood alcohol content would have affected her mental or physical faculties and because Me. Rev. Stat. 29-A, 2432(1) is inapplicable. View "State v. Souther" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the adjudications entered by the trial court after a consolidated nonjury trial that found that Defendant committed the traffic infraction of “failure to maintain control of a motor vehicle” and committed the civil violation of “motor vehicle violation resulting in death.” The court held (1) the court did not commit an error of law when it determined that the State was not required to prove the activity that Defendant was engaged in that distracted him; and (2) the evidence was sufficient for the court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant was engaged in the operation of a motor vehicle while distracted. View "State v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Evelyn and Elijah, twins, were born to parents who had previously been found guilty of manslaughter. The twins went from the hospital into foster care. The district court later terminated both parents’ parental rights to the twins. The parents appealed and moved for relief from the judgment of termination and later moved for relief from the court’s initial finding of jeopardy, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court concluded that trial counsel had been ineffective at the jeopardy stage and vacated the termination order. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the court’s judgment granting the parents’ motion for relief as it affected the original jeopardy determination and remanded, holding that the district court erred in addressing the parents’ untimely raised ineffective assistance of counsel allegations, in ordering further reunification efforts, and in declining to adjudicate the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the termination proceeding. View "In re Evelyn A." on Justia Law