Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a registered nurse, filed a complaint alleging that Mercy Hospital discriminated against her in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA) by terminating her employment because of her alleged disability and refusing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation. The superior court entered summary judgment for Mercy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim because there was no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff was not a “qualified individual with a disability” as defined by the MHRA. View "Carnicella v. Mercy Hospital" on Justia Law

In 2004, Michael Bailey began to receive partial incapacity benefits stemming from a workplace injury. In 2007, a hearing officer found that Bailey had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) and that he had sustained an injury that resulted in a permanent impairment level of thirty-two percent. In 2013, the City of Lewiston filed a petition seeking review of the level of Bailey’s incapacity and a petition seeking to determine the extent of his permanent impairment. The hearing officer concluded that there was a change of circumstances warranting a new permanent impairment finding and reduced Bailey’s permanent impairment level to zero percent. The decree thus terminated Bailey’s entitlement to further compensation. The Workers’ Compensation Board Appellate Division vacated the hearing officer’s decree, ruling that the 2007 determination of permanent impairment as of the date of MMI was final, and therefore, the doctrine of res judicata barred relitigation of that issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Division did not err in concluding that relitigation of Bailey’s permanent impairment level was barred by res judicata principles. View "Bailey v. City of Lewiston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother’s parental rights to her child. Contrary to Mother’s contentions, the court held (1) Mother was not deprived of due process because the district court afforded her sufficient notice of the termination hearing before terminating her parental rights and did not place undue weight not he earlier termination of Mother’s rights to another child; and (2) the court’s findings were sufficient as a matter of law, and the court’s judgment was the “result of the application of independent judicial thought to the process of making fact-findings and conclusions.” View "In re Zoey H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s sentences totaling sixty years following Defendant’s guilty plea to four counts of gross sexual assault. This was Defendant’s second appeal arising out of the events that led to these charges. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the trial court was not required to find specific aggravating circumstances before imposing what Defendant claimed was a de facto life sentence; and (2) the trial court did not impose an illegal sentence because Defendant's aggregate sentence was neither disproportionate to the offenses charged, nor did the sentence offend prevailing notions of decency. View "State v. Hoover" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother’s parental rights to her two minor children. On appeal, Mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s findings that the children could not wait for permanency and that Mother failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify. Mother also challenged the court’s determination that termination of her parental rights - not the creation of a permanency guardianship - was in the best interest of her children. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the evidence supported the court’s findings and discretionary determinations. View "In re Haylie W." on Justia Law

Rowland Whittet appealed from a superior court judgment granting a permanent injunction and authorizing a special master to proceed with the sale of a parcel of real estate. In this appeal, Daniel Whittet filed a motion for sanctions. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment and imposed a sanction of attorney fees and treble costs, holding (1) Rowland failed to provide transcripts of relevant proceedings to allow for adequate appellate review and made no argument as to why the court erred; and (2) Rowland asserted meritless claims and arguments that have been rejected and effectively delayed enforcement of a previous judgment and wasted time and resources. View "Whittet v. Whittet" on Justia Law

Alan Miller, acting “individually and in the right of” and for the benefit of SAM Miller, Inc. (SMI), filed a second amended complaint against Miller’s Lobster Company, Inc. (MLC), Steve Miller, and Mark Miller (collectively, the Millers) seeking injunctive relief and damages arising out of the lease of wharf property by SMI to MLC. The court granted the Millers’ and SMI’s motions for summary judgment, concluding that Alan Miller’s claims were barred on limitations grounds. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Alan’s action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that Alan did not meet his burden to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the limitations period was nevertheless tolled or otherwise inapplicable. View "Miller v. Miller" on Justia Law

Dawn Haskell and Martin Witham (together, Plaintiffs) filed a complaint against Grover Bragg and Donald York (together, Defendants), asserting a claim for negligence against Defendants. Bragg did not timely file an answer after being served and did not otherwise appear in or defend in the matter. The clerk entered a default against Bragg. The court awarded compensatory damages based on the allegations in the complaint. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that although the trial court erred when it considered evidence of comparative negligence, the error was harmless because the court found that Plaintiffs were not negligent. View "Haskell v. Bragg" on Justia Law

In 1970, Beauchene was acquitted of a murder charge by reason of mental disease or defect and was committed to the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services, where he remains committed pursuant to 15 M.R.S. 103. In 2016, Beauchene filed a petition seeking a discharge or a modified treatment plan. The court held a hearing at which three mental health professionals testified. The court denied the petition, finding that Beauchene had been diagnosed with “explosive personality,” had escaped from custody in 1973 and was returned to custody in 1978, had escaped again and fled to New York, where he was convicted of rape, sodomy, and assault in 1980, and has mental health symptoms consistent with anti-social personality disorder. The court concluded that Beauchene’s mental condition has “changed very little, if any[,] since” 1970, and if discharged, released, or placed in a modified treatment plan, Beauchene would pose a risk of harm or danger to himself or to others. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, finding that Beauchene’s mental health symptoms constituted a “mental disease or defect” and that the statute provides sufficient notice and is not unconstitutionally vague and rejecting a due process claim. View "Beauchene v. State of Maine" on Justia Law

RIHC, a Maine nonprofit entity, owns Roque Island, 1,242 acres of land, with five houses and numerous outbuildings. Roque Island is a homestead that has been owned by the same family since the early 1800s. In 2010, Jonesport hired a certified private assessor for revaluation of all town properties. The assessor used state-approved assessment software. Its calculations include the character of the neighborhood so that values for island properties are calculated at a lower rate because they are not benefitted by certain services that mainland properties receive. Building values on islands are subject to an “economic obsolescence factor” of 200%, resulting in a greater assessed value than for a comparable mainland structures because of the additional cost of building on an island. Due to an oversight, the economic obsolescence factor originating with the 2010 revaluation was not fully applied to the Island structures until the 2014 tax year, when their total valuation increased by 52% from the previous year. RIHC sought an abatement of $1,305,150 from the 2014 building valuation assessment of $2,609,846, which would result in a property tax reduction of $20,000. That application was constructively denied. The Board of Appeals also denied RIHC’s application, concluding that RIHC’s buildings were being taxed consistently with buildings on islands in other towns. The lower court and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed; the record does not compel the conclusion that the rate differentiation is unjustly discriminatory. View "Roque Island Gardner Homestead Corp. v. Town of Jonesport" on Justia Law