Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The district court terminated father’s parental rights, 22 M.R.S. 4055(1)(B)(2), finding, by clear and convincing evidence that he is unfit; that termination of his parental rights was in the children’s best interest; and that the permanency plan for the children would be adoption. The mother of the boys was previously found to have abandoned them. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, finding that the evidence supported finding that father is unwilling or unable to protect the children from jeopardy within a time reasonably calculated to meet their needs; is unwilling or unable to take responsibility for them within that timeframe; and failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the children. The court noted father’s incarceration until at least July 2017, the testimony of mental health experts that the children “are very damaged, ” father’s history of substance abuse, including while he was incarcerated, which delayed his release, and his inconsistent communication with the children. The court noted extensive testimony about the need for permanency and stability for the children. View "In re: Mathew H." on Justia Law

Hall filed a foreclosure claim against Camden Hills on two sets of notes and mortgages on Camden residential property. By a May 2014 judgment, the Knox County Superior Court denied Hall’s claim, concluding that Hall had not given Camden Hills sufficient notice of right to cure, 14 M.R.S. 6111. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. In 2014, Hall filed a second foreclosure complaint in the District Court (Rockland). Camden Hills filed an answer denying the substantive allegations of default and asserting res judicata. Hall sought summary judgment. Camden Hills did not file a timely opposition or objection. Camden’s subsequent motion to dismiss alleged that the first foreclosure action was decided by a final judgment involving the same parties and the same cause of action. The court denied Camden Hills’s motion to dismiss and granted Hall summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed Camden Hills’s appeal without reaching the merits because Camden Hills failed to comply with M.R. App. P. 8, addressing organization and the order in which documents are to appear in the appendix to the briefs. View "Hall v. Camden Hills Farm by the Sea, LLC" on Justia Law

The court terminated mother’s parental rights, 22 M.R.S. 4055(1)(A),(B), finding that she is unfit to parent the children because she has abandoned them, she is unwilling and unable to protect them from jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet their needs, and she has failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with them. The court also terminated the parental rights of the father of each child. Mother did not challenge the findings relating to termination of her rights but claimed that the children’s current placement, with their maternal grandparents, is unsafe, and that permanent placement there would not be in the children’s best interests. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, noting that the best interests determination in connection with the termination of mother’s parental rights was not a determination of who will adopt the children or that any particular placement is in their best interests. To the extent that mother seeks to challenge the court’s order identifying adoption as the permanency plan, 22 M.R.S. 4038-B(3), that order is interlocutory and not appealable. View "In re: Dominic B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, entered after a jury trial, for one count of theft by unauthorized taking or transfer, eleven counts of failure to pay tax or file a Maine State tax return, and one count of tampering with public records or information. On appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find her guilty of theft and tampering with public records. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find each element of theft by unauthorized taking beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendant of tampering with public records. View "State v. Viles" on Justia Law

Certain property owners in the vicinity of a proposed lease site (“the Neighbors”) brought a Me. R. Civ. P. 80C appeal from a judgment of the superior court that affirmed in part and vacated in part a decision of the Department of Marine resources granting Joseph Porada a limited purpose aquaculture lease to farm oysters and quahogs in Morgan Bay in Surry. The superior court vacated the decision insofar as it granted Porada a lease covering four acres and remanded the matter to the Department to reduce the area of the site from four to two acres. The superior court also dismissed as duplicative several independent claims for declaratory relief brought with the appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the judgment was not final. View "Estate of Jack R. Pirozzolo v. Department of Marine Resources" on Justia Law

Kimberly Heilig appealed from a judgment of the district court divorcing her from Ernest Neri, dividing the parties’ assets, ordering Neri to pay Heilig’s spousal support for three years, and ordering Neri to pay $2,000 toward Heilig’s attorney fees. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not clearly err in finding that real estate purchased by Neri during the marriage was nonmarital property; (2) did not abuse its discretion in calculating Heilig’s spousal support award; and (3) did not abuse its discretion by awarding Heilig a lesser amount of legal fees than she requested. View "Neri v. Heilig" on Justia Law

Linda Shelley executed a note in favor of First Magnus Financial Corporation. On the same day, Linda and John Shelley executed a mortgage on certain property as security for the loan. The note was endorsed in blank and was eventually held by MTGLQ Investors, L.P. John and Linda later deed the property to Shelley Alley. After Linda died, the note went into default. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. filed a foreclosure complaint, naming John Shelley as the defendant and Alley as a party in interest. The trial court entered a judgment of foreclosure in favor of MTGLQ. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the debtor - presumably, the Estate of Linda Shelley - was a necessary party to this foreclosure action. Because the debtor was not named as a party in this matter, and court vacated the judgment of foreclosure and remanded with instructions to dismiss the matter without prejudice. View "MTGLQ Investors, L.P. v. Alley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of murder, burglary of a dwelling, and theft. The judgment of conviction was entered after a trial in which the State presented the murder charge on alternative theories - intentional or knowing murder and depraved indifference murder. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Defendant was the person who caused the victim’s death; and (2) depraved indifference murder was properly submitted to the jury as an alternative to intentional or knowing murder, and the evidence was sufficient to support any of the alternative theories of murder. View "State v. Cummings" on Justia Law

Mother appealed from a judgment of divorce entered in the district court, arguing that the provision requiring each parent to transport, or allow the other parent to transport, the parties’ children to extracurricular activities violated her constitutionally-protected liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of her children. The provision was entered after a dispute between the parents over the children’s level of involvement in a developmental soccer league. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) a court order that allows one parent to make the decision on a disputed child-related issue does not violate the constitutional rights of either parent; and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that continued participation in soccer was in each child’s best interest, or in ordering the default transportation provision. View "Mills v. Fleming" on Justia Law

The superior court did not err in finding that Peter Beckerman had a deeded right-of-way over property owned by Ricky and Monica Conant and that the right-of-way was located over the Conants’ paved driveway. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) the trial court did not err in determining that the language of the 1978 deed was ambiguous, with the ambiguity resolvable by concluding that the deed conferred a right-of-way across the Conants’ property; and (2) the trial court did not err when it determined that the deeded right-of-way was over the existing paved driveway on the Conant lot. View "Beckerman v. Conant" on Justia Law